The development of the Hungarian Special Operations Forces between 2003 and 2009 by Wohlram, Gyula
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2011-03
The development of the Hungarian Special
Operations Forces between 2003 and 2009
Wohlram, Gyula













Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE HUNGARIAN SPECIAL 








 Thesis Advisor: Kalev Sepp 
 Second Reader: George Lober 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
i 
 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
March 2011 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  The Development of the Hungarian Special Operations 
Forces Between 2003 and 2009 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Gyula Wohlram 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Hungarian MoD or the HDF Defense Staff. IRB Protocol Number _________N/A_____________. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
Hungarian Special Operations Forces have the potential to enhance the security of Hungary.  Seven years have passed 
from 2002, when the survey of the Cubic advisory team first recommended creating the Hungarian Special Operations 
Forces, until 2009 when these forces began operating in Afghanistan.  In 2003, the Hungarian Ministry of Defense’s 
comprehensive defense review identified special operations forces as a “niche” capability that could add strength to 
the defense forces and fill critical shortfalls in Peace Support Operations.  The Hungarian political leadership 
endorsed developing a special operations capability package to enhance national security, contribute to the collective 
security of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union, and fill shortfalls in Peace Support 
Operations led by these two international organizations. 
In the last seven years, the Hungarian Defense Forces have created the legal framework for developing and employing 
their Special Operations Forces, assigned and trained units involved in the capability package, and made progress in 
establishing a special operations oversight structure and integrating these forces into the Hungarian defense 
establishment.  Mentored by U.S. instructors, the Hungarian Defense Forces have made great progress, but there 
remains much to do.  Most importantly, the political and military leadership should fully exploit capabilities of these 
forces for the security of Hungary. 
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
109 
14. SUBJECT TERMS Effectiveness, Hungary, NATO, Special Forces, Special Operations 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
ii 
 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
iii 
 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE HUNGARIAN SPECIAL OPERATIONS 




Major, Hungarian Defense Forces, Army 
B.A., National Defense University, 1993 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 


































Hungarian Special Operations Forces have the potential to enhance the security of 
Hungary.  Seven years have passed from 2002, when the survey of the Cubic advisory 
team first recommended creating the Hungarian Special Operations Forces, until 2009 
when these forces began operating in Afghanistan.  In 2003, the Hungarian Ministry of 
Defense’s comprehensive defense review identified special operations forces as a “niche” 
capability that could add strength to the defense forces and fill critical shortfalls in Peace 
Support Operations.  The Hungarian political leadership endorsed developing a special 
operations capability package to enhance national security, contribute to the collective 
security of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union, and fill 
shortfalls in Peace Support Operations led by these two international organizations. 
In the last seven years, the Hungarian Defense Forces have created the legal 
framework for developing and employing their Special Operations Forces, assigned and 
trained units involved in the capability package, and made progress in establishing a 
special operations oversight structure and integrating these forces into the Hungarian 
defense establishment.  Mentored by U.S. instructors, the Hungarian Defense Forces have 
made great progress, but there remains much to do.  Most importantly, the political and 
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This thesis is a historical study that covers the development of the Hungarian Special 
Operations Forces between 1939 and 2009, with the main focus on the period of 2003–
2009.  The developing Hungarian Special Operations Forces have the potential to 
enhance the security of Hungary.  Seven years after their initial conception, these Special 
Operations Forces are now operating in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization-led 
operation in Afghanistan. 
In 2003, the Hungarian Ministry of Defense’s comprehensive defense review 
identified special operations forces as a “niche” capability that could add strength to the 
defense forces and fill critical shortfalls in Peace Support Operations.  The Hungarian 
political leadership endorsed developing a special operations capability package to 
enhance national security, contribute to the collective security of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization and the European Union, and fill shortfalls in Peace Support 
Operations led by these two international organizations. 
The Hungarian Defense Forces (HDF) scheduled the development of their Special 
Operations Forces in two phases.  Units missing from the Hungarian Special Operations 
Forces (HUNSOF) capability package were established in phase one.  One of these was 
the 34th ‘László Bercsényi’ Special Operations Battalion, established on September 1, 
2005, by transforming the long-range reconnaissance battalion into a special forces 
battalion.  This thesis studies this transformation.  The strengthening of the cooperation 
between units in the HUNSOF capability package is currently underway in phase two. 
In the last seven years, the Hungarian Defense Forces have created the legal 
framework for developing and employing their Special Operations Forces.  The HDF 
established units missing from the Hungarian Special Operations Forces capability 
package, and the tactical and operational command and control elements of their Special 
Operations Forces; selected, trained, and educated their Special Operations Forces 
personnel; and made progress in integrating these forces into Hungarian defense 
establishment.  Although the development of the HUNSOF is progressing, this thesis 
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identifies points where the development and employment of the HUNSOF could be 
improved, and recommends improvements to the Hungarian Special Operations Forces 
themselves. 
By deploying the Hungarian Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan, the 
political and military leadership have achieved one of the national interests in developing 
these forces:  The HUNSOF fills shortfalls in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization-led 
International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.  In order to achieve other national 
interests in developing the HUNSOF – to add strength to the defense forces and enhance 
national security – the Hungarian defense establishment should consider employing the 
HUNSOF, especially their Special Forces elements, as an anti- and counter-terrorism 
capability. 
The development of the Hungarian Special Operations Forces is mentored and 
supported by the United States Department of Defense.  The Hungarian Defense Forces 
do not use national financial resources; rather, they have been using external resources to 
finance the development and improvement of these forces.  Should political, economic 
and social conditions turn favorable, the HDF should also invest Hungarian forints into 
the development of their Special Operations Forces, which is considered to be one of the 
major ongoing HDF development projects.  By doing so, less time would be required to 
attain world-class and fully operational special operations forces. 
The strategic command and control element of the Hungarian Special Operations 
Forces is yet to be established.  This thesis executes a theoretical exercise that compares 
options for the strategic command and control element of HUNSOF.  Considering the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Forces Study points of reference, 
and the current organizational design of the Hungarian Defense Forces, the HDF should 
assign a two-star Deputy Commander of the Hungarian Defense Forces Joint Forces 
Command for Special Operations Forces, with a small expert staff in the short-term.  This 
strategic command and control element of the HUNSOF would advise the political and 




The development and employment of the Hungarian Special Operations Forces 
also require subject matter experts.  The Hungarian Defense Forces do not, however, 
have an institution that could teach Special Operations Forces and Special Forces-related 
subjects to the HUNSOF or raise Special Operations Forces thinkers.  Therefore, the 
HDF and the HUNSOF community should develop subject matter experts by continuing 
to assign non-commissioned and commissioned officers to attend foreign military 
schools, academies, centers, and other educational institutions in the short-term.  The 
graduates could then accumulate knowledge, collect best international practices, 
rigorously and systematically study the Special Operations Forces discipline, prepare 
analyses and recommendations, analyze Special Operations Forces history, follow 
international trends, and study how to optimize the stewardship of the HUNSOF.  The 
Hungarian Defense Forces could then improve their Special Operations Forces by 
exploiting the gathered knowledge and experience of these graduates.  The HDF and the 
HUNSOF community could develop their subject matter experts by assigning the Peace 
Support Training Centre for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Centre of Excellence 
for Special Operations Forces in the mid- and long-terms. 
The Hungarian Special Operations Forces, in their first two rotations in 
Afghanistan between February and October 2009, carried out both direct and indirect 
tasks to support the Afghan conventional forces in countering an insurgency.  This thesis 
assesses the effectiveness of the HUNSOF in Afghanistan with a newly- designed set of 
guiding criteria, the Collaborative Assessment Guide, because there is no universally 
accepted model that measures combat effectiveness and none of the existing models 
focus on collaboration with indigenous forces and population, a key aspect in countering 
insurgencies.  This assessment points out that the HUNSOF should improve their ability 
to collaborate with relevant indigenous and international stakeholders involved in 
conflicts.  Therefore, the HUNSOF and their Special Forces component should change 
their personnel selection mechanism, and develop a balanced set of selection criteria that 
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The engagement of the U.S. Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan soundly 
demonstrated that these forces could effectively contribute to counter-terrorism and 
counter-insurgency.  Highly-trained U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) were 
deployed to Afghanistan on short notice in October 2001, only weeks after the U.S. 
intelligence apparatus confirmed the Taliban regime had supported and provided safe 
haven to the international terrorist organization al Qaeda, responsible for the terrorists’ 
attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001.  SOF represented the first wave of 
U.S. troops in Afghanistan and not only set the stage for the arrival of the main body, but 
managed to overthrow the rogue Taliban regime in two months.  The impressive 
achievement of U.S. SOF came from their unique capability to effectively operate by, 
through, and with the indigenous population and forces.  U.S. SOF unified anti-Taliban 
militias and led the Afghan Northern Alliance to oust the Taliban regime.  The later 
waves of U.S. general purpose forces pushed the Taliban leadership out of Afghanistan 
into Pakistan, where the Taliban managed to resurrect and launch an insurrection into 
Afghanistan.  Nonetheless, the U.S. SOF achieved remarkable results in the early phases 
of the military campaign. 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Forces Study (NATO 
SOF Study) states “spectacular feats of triumph and tragic failures have served as 
catalysts” for developing special operations forces worldwide in the last three and a half 
decades.1  Recently, the U.S.-led war on terrorism, especially its SOF dimension, has 
served as a catalyst for a new wave of nations developing capabilities to counter 
asymmetric challenges around the world.  Allied militaries, partner states, and other 
nations have been impressed by the effect that some 350 U.S. SOF personnel could 
generate in such a short time.  The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) soon 
                                                 
1 North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Coordination Centre, The North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization Special Operations Forces Study (NSCC, 2008), 1. 
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joined the war on terrorism and the nation-building effort in Afghanistan.2  As a result, 
allied militaries have started to analyze which military capabilities they could contribute 
to the allied fight against international terrorism.  Seeing U.S. SOF effectiveness in 
Afghanistan, some Eastern and Central European NATO member counties such as 
Hungary and Romania have identified SOF as a capability that could add great value to 
NATO’s collective efforts, and have subsequently decided to develop their own SOF.  
Poland has received incentives from the U.S. SOF success in Afghanistan to enhance and 
increase the autonomy of Poland’s developing SOF.  In addition to these Eastern and 
Central European NATO counties, Mexico is also developing SOF.3  In summary, SOF is 
undergoing a world-wide rebirth: many states are currently developing SOF because of 
the U.S. SOF successes in Afghanistan. 
In 2003, the Hungarian Ministry of Defense directed a comprehensive defense 
review in order to identify the direction for the future development of the Hungarian 
Defense Forces (HDF).  The paramount observation of the defense review was that the 
HDF simply could not generate a full spectrum of military capabilities because the total 
number of defense forces personnel is 24,500.  Rather, the HDF had to identify a handful 
of so-called “niche” capabilities that could add the most strength to the defense forces 
and fill up critical shortfalls in multinational Peace Support Operations.  By doing so, the 
HDF could effectively contribute to the collective security of NATO and the European 
Union (EU), which has been one of the HDF’s main tasks, as well as to military 
                                                 
2 As of 2009, NATO represents an Alliance of 28 member countries including Albania, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.  The fundamental role of 
NATO is to safeguard the freedom and security of its member countries by political and military means.  
The Bonn Agreement, signed in Bonn, Germany on December 22, 2001, marks the starting point of 
NATO’s involvement in the stabilization of Afghanistan.  Chapter V of this thesis provides more details 
about NATO’s military engagement in Afghanistan.  North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “What is 
NATO?,” http://www.nato.int (accessed August 13, 2008). 
3 Author’s interview with Lieutenant Commander Alfonso Garces Reyes, Mexican Navy, Naval 
Postgraduate School, April 15, 2009. 
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operations led by these two international organizations.4  Therefore, the HDF decided to 
establish forces that are capable of conducting civil-military cooperation; psychological 
operations; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense; information 
operations; and special operations.  This thesis provides a historical study of the 
development of the Hungarian Special Operations Forces (HUNSOF) between 2003 and 
2009.  Views and thoughts presented in this thesis do not represent the official stance of 
the Republic of Hungary or the Hungarian Ministry of Defense. 
A. TARGET AUDIENCE 
This thesis targets the HDF Operations Center, Lessons Learned Section; the 
Special Operations Section within J-3 of the HDF Joint Forces Command (JFC); and the 
HDF Peace Support Training Centre. 
The HDF Operations Center, Lessons Learned Section collects and produces 
ideas that might improve any aspect of the Hungarian Defense Forces, and the Section 
has a direct connection to senior military decision-makers.  The Special Operations 
Section within J-3 of the HDF Joint Forces Command is the operational, and highest 
existing, command and control element of the HUNSOF and it also has a direct 
connection to senior military decision-makers.  The HDF Peace Support Training Centre 
carried out the qualification course of SOF operators in 2008 and is a candidate for the 
NATO Centre of Excellence for SOF.  The Centre accumulates scientific studies of SOF.  
Therefore, it is worthwhile to target these three organizations with this thesis. 
The hope is that this thesis will induce further thinking in academic and military 
circles, and the HUNSOF community; and generate discussion about the stewardship 
options for the HUNSOF and the newly designed Collaborative Assessment Guide. 
                                                 
4 Hungary is a NATO member state since 1999, and gained membership in the European Union in 
2004.  The European Union is an economic and political union of 27 member states that are: Austria, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.  Europa, “Basic Information,” 
http://europa.eu (accessed August 13, 2008). 
4 
 
B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
The target audience fundamentally determines the purpose of this thesis.  This 
thesis records the origins of the HUNSOF, analyzes phase one of the HUNSOF 
development process, assesses the HUNSOF effectiveness in Afghanistan, identifies 
points at which the development and employment of the HUNSOF could be improved, 
and recommends improvements to the HUNSOF. 
This thesis: 
 records the origins and development of the HUNSOF from the 1930’s to 
the present because the development of the HUNSOF, one of the major 
ongoing HDF development projects, is little studied. 
 studies the options for stewardship for the HUNSOF and outlines the 
recommendations for determining the optimal stewardship for the 
HUNSOF because these forces do not have a strategic command and 
control element. 
 assesses the effectiveness of the HUNSOF in Afghanistan with a newly 
designed set of guiding criteria, the Collaborative Assessment Guide, 
because there is no universally accepted model that measures combat 
effectiveness, and none of the existing models focus on collaboration with 
indigenous forces and population, a key aspect in countering insurgencies. 
 focuses on phase one of the HUNSOF development process because this 
period is not studied yet, and identifies lessons in this period that could 
then improve the HUNSOF.  In 2003, the political and military leadership 
decided to establish the HUNSOF.  The HDF outlined the development of 
the HUNSOF that is basically a capability package in two phases.  Units 
missing from the HUNSOF capability package were to be established in 
phase one.  This thesis studies the progress the HDF made in developing 
the 34th ‘László Bercsényi’ Special Operations Battalion in phase one, 
including their deployment in Afghanistan, identifies points at which the 
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development and employment of the HUNSOF could be improved, and 
recommends improvements to the HUNSOF.  The cooperation between 
units in the HUNSOF capability package will be strengthened in the 
ongoing phase two that invites Hungarian subject matter experts for 
analysis. 
C. METHOD OF ANALYSIS 
This thesis is a historical study of the development of the HUNSOF.  Alexander 
L. George and Andrew Bennett state in Case Studies and Theory Development in the 
Social Sciences that process tracing or analytic narrative help to examine relationships 
through time within one single case.5  Since the development of the HUNSOF is a series 
of events where chronology matters, process tracing is appropriate for this thesis. 
This thesis uses process tracing in Chapters II, IV, and V.  Interviews with 
German, Hungarian, Norwegian, and Polish SOF officers have contributed to Chapters 
III, IV, and V.  This thesis also uses comparisons in Chapters III and IV. 
D. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
This thesis is structured as follows.  Chapter I introduces the thesis and covers the 
target audience, purpose and scope, method of analysis, and organization of the thesis. 
Chapter II explains the Hungarian understanding of SOF and the legal framework 
of the development and employment of the HUNSOF; summarizes the pioneering 
master’s thesis of Porkoláb and Bári, and provides elements that were materialized from 
their thesis; and provides insight into the history of the parachutist/reconnaissance 
battalion, the core of the HUNSOF, between 1939 and 2009. 
Chapter III executes a theoretical exercise that compares options for the strategic 
command and control element of HUNSOF and outlines the recommendations for 
determining the optimal stewardship for the HUNSOF. 
                                                 
5 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences (Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 2005), 208. 
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Chapter IV studies phase one of the HUNSOF development process in which the 
HDF transformed the 34th ‘László Bercsényi’ Long-range Reconnaissance Battalion into 
a special forces battalion between 2003 and 2009.  Chapter IV compares the Hungarian 
national interests to develop a Special Military Unit with those of the Danish, German, 
Norwegian, and Polish Special Military Units.  Chapter IV studies the major challenges 
the HDF faced while developing its SOF between 2003 and 2009 and identifies points at 
which the development and employment of the HUNSOF could be improved. 
Chapter V studies the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 
the ISAF SOF, and the deployment of the HUNSOF’s first two rotations in Afghanistan 
between February and October 2009 and identifies points at which the development and 
employment of the HUNSOF could be improved. 
Chapter VI introduces the Collaborative Assessment Guide, uses it to assess the 
HUNSOF effectiveness in Afghanistan, and identifies points at which the development 
and employment of the HUNSOF could be improved. 
Chapter VII concludes the findings of this thesis and recommends improvements 
to the HUNSOF. 
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II. THE HUNGARIAN SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 
BETWEEN 1939 AND 2009 
The military has not been the first recourse of modern Hungarian statecraft.  The 
military and the employment of the defense forces are vital instruments of statecraft.  
Nonetheless, in the last seven decades the Hungarian political leadership has employed 
its Defense Forces with varying levels of intensity.  Defense Forces played a key role in 
the 1940s, especially during World War II, and Hungarian political leaders used military 
forces intensively.  The Cold War, however, changed the attitude of communist 
Hungarian regimes toward their defense forces.  Participation in the invasion of 
Czechoslovakia was the single major employment of the Hungarian People’s Army 
during the four decades of the Cold War.  In August 1968, forces from five of the 
Warsaw Pact countries; Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and the Soviet Union, 
jointly invaded Czechoslovakia in order to destroy the liberalization process.  Democratic 
Hungarian regimes have since rediscovered their defense forces and employed them often 
in Peace Support Operations in the Post-Cold War World.  The history of the Hungarian 
Special Forces contains unique features, but its evolution has been fundamentally 
determined by the politicians’ willingness to employ defense forces in general.  
Therefore, the history of the Hungarian Special Forces is similar to that of the Hungarian 
Defense Forces. 
This chapter provides the legal and historical context for the development of the 
HUNSOF.  The first section explains the Hungarian understanding of SOF and the legal 
framework for the development and the employment of the HUNSOF.  The second 
section reviews the results of the development of the HUNSOF.  There are only a few 
academic studies on the development of the HUNSOF.  In their pioneering master’s 
thesis, Imre Porkoláb and Gábor Bári envisioned the mission, structure, tasks, command 
and control of the HUNSOF.6  In his master’s thesis Csaba Kovács offers an analysis of 
                                                 
6 Imre Porkoláb and Gábor Bári, Enhancing National Security in Hungary through the Development 
and Employment of Special Forces (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 2006). 
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the missions and limitations of the HUNSOF, and its cooperation with other branches and 
services.7  The second section summarizes attributes that were materialized from the 
vision of Porkoláb and Bári.  The third section provides insight into the history of the 
parachutist/reconnaissance battalion that was transformed into a SOF battalion.  The 
fourth section summarizes the findings of Chapter II. 
A. UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES 
The guiding principles of the development and the employment of the HUNSOF 
capability are set in the Paper of the Chief of Defense Staff of the Ministry of Defense that 
was countersigned by the Minister of Defense.8  The Paper states that either the 
Parliament or the Government of the Republic of Hungary is eligible to decide about the 
employment of the HUNSOF within or beyond the boundaries of Hungary.  The Paper 
states that the HUNSOF can be deployed: 
 to defend the sovereignty of the Republic of Hungary against external 
aggression upon the defined task for the HDF in Article 70, paragraph (1), 
subparagraph a) of the Act No. CV of 2004 on the country’s defense and 
the HDF (hereinafter referred to as National Defense Law).  The 
HUNSOF fulfills related tasks individually or in cooperation with other 
military or security forces, under national or NATO command, within or 
beyond the boundaries of Hungary. 
 to execute commitments in special operations, especially those of 
collective defense specified in NATO and international contracts beyond 
the boundaries of the Republic of Hungary upon the defined task for the 
Hungarian Defense Forces in Article 70, paragraph (1), subparagraph b) of 
the National Defense Law.  The HUNSOF fulfills related tasks, especially 
                                                 
7 Csaba Kovács, A Különleges Műveleti Erők Helye, Szerepe és Tevékenysége a 21. Század Katonai 
Műveleteiben (Budapest: Miklós Zrínyi National Defense University, 2007). 
8 Colonel General András Havril, “A Magyar Honvédség Különleges Műveleti Képessége 
Alkalmazásának és Fejlesztésének Alapelvei, Reference no. MK HM 1194/2008,” Ministry of Defense of 
the Republic of Hungary, July 28, 2008. 
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in United Nations (UN) -mandated multinational missions, and NATO and 
coalition campaigns in all spectrums of the conflicts. 
 to participate in the achievement of the military objectives of the fight 
against international terrorism beyond the boundaries of the Republic of 
Hungary upon the defined task for the HDF in Article 70, paragraph (1), 
subparagraph c) of the National Defense Law.  The HUNSOF fulfills 
related tasks especially in UN-mandated multinational missions, and 
NATO and coalition campaigns in all spectrums of the conflicts. 
 to participate in the fight against armed conflict within the boundaries of 
the Republic of Hungary in case a state of emergency declared.  Article 
70, paragraph (1), subparagraph f) of the National Defense Law that also 
refers to the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary for describing those 
circumstances under which defense forces may be used within the 
boundaries of Hungary: 
In the event of armed actions aimed at overturning constitutional order or 
at the acquisition of exclusive control of public power, or in the case of 
grave acts of violence committed by force of arms or by armed groups 
which endanger the lives and property of citizens on a mass scale, during a 
state of emergency declared in accordance with the provisions of the 
Constitution, the armed forces may be used, if the use of the police proves 
insufficient.9 
 to participate in disaster relief operations, especially of search and rescue, 
within the boundaries of the Republic of Hungary upon the defined task 
for the Hungarian Defense Forces in Article 70, paragraph (1), 
subparagraph h) of the National Defense Law.  The HUNSOF fulfills 
related tasks unarmed.10 
                                                 
9 The Parliament of the Republic of the Hungary, Act XX of 1949, The Constitution of the Republic of 
Hungary, Chapter VIII. The Armed Forces and the Police, Article/40B sub paragraph (2), October 23, 
1989. 




The Paper emphasizes that the HUNSOF is essentially a capability package of 
special forces, combat support forces, special operations capable forces or enablers, 
combat service support, and command and control elements.  In that regard, this thesis 
will focus specifically on the development of the 34th ‘László Bercsényi’ Special 
Operations Battalion that represents the special forces of the HUNSOF.  Figure 1 shows 
the HUNSOF capability package. 
 
Figure 1. The HUNSOF Capability Package 
The airmobile infantry of the 25/88 Light Mixed Battalion constitutes the land 
element, while assault and transport helicopters of the 86th Szolnok Helicopter Base form 
the air element of the combat support forces.  The current air element of combat support 
forces does not, however, meet all the operational requirements; therefore, the air element 
is considered to be temporary until the HDF develops new capabilities for fixed- and 
rotary-wing aircrafts, and train the respective crews to adequately support the special 
forces and the airmobile infantry. 
Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) operators of 
the Military Intelligence Office of the Republic of Hungary and the 24th “Gergely 
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Bornemissza” Reconnaissance Battalion of the 5th “István Bocskai” Infantry Brigade; 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and their crews of the 24th “Gergely Bornemissza” 
Reconnaissance Battalion of the 5th “István Bocskai” Infantry Brigade; Chemical, 
Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) laboratory and its crew of the “Dr. 
György Radó” Honvéd Medical Center; Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), and 
Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) and Information Operations (IO) experts of the 
Civilian-Military Cooperation and Psychological Operations Centre embody the special 
operations capable forces. 
The Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC), the HUNSOF’s own logistical 
elements (S-4), and multinational/coalition logistical support (J-4); such as the NATO 
Strategic Airlift Interim Solution, cover combat service support elements.11 
The leaders of all the involved units represent the tactical (TAC) command and 
control element.  The Special Operations Section within J-3 of the JFC is the operational 
(OP) command and control element, and the strategic (STR) command and control 
element is still to be established. 
This section explained the Hungarian understanding of SOF and the legal 
framework for the development and the employment of the HUNSOF.  The next section 
reviews the results of the development of the HUNSOF. 
                                                 
11 Since 2000, the HDF Peace Support Training Centre also carries out the pre-deployment training for 
Hungarian military, police, and civilian personnel, and conducts the International Military Observer Course 
that is accredited (2007) by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.  Air refueling and strategic 
airlifting became acute capability gaps after NATO launched operations out of the Euro-Atlantic region.  In 
order to fill these capability gaps, NATO has created the Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS).  The 
initial contract for SALIS was signed by NATO Maintenance and Support Agency (NAMSA), representing 
NATO interests, and Ruslan SALIS GmbH, representing Antonov ASTC (Ukraine) and Volga-Dnepr 
(Russia) group of companies in Leipzig, Germany on January 13, 2006.  This contract has allowed NATO 
to use AN-124 Ruslan transport aircrafts for strategic air transport under favorable financial agreements 
between January 1, 2006 and December 31, 2008.  In accordance with the contract, two AN-124-100 
airplanes are constantly based in the airport of Leipzig, ready to carry out cargo at the request of 16 NATO-
member countries: Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the United Kingdom, and 
two partner nations: Finland and Sweden.  The contract was prolonged until December 31, 2010.  North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO A-Z, Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS),” 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50106.htm (accessed September 1, 2009). 
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B. FROM VISION TO REALITY 
The master’s thesis of Porkoláb and Bári has provided the theoretical framework 
for the development of the HUNSOF, and these forces are being developed based on their 
vision.  The parachutist/reconnaissance battalion, which is the predecessor of the special 
forces element of the HUNSOF, has been widely studied, and there is a growing body of 
literature about it.  Since the Special Operations Battalion is, however, a young military 
unit and the HUNSOF is a new capability package, the military discipline of SOF is 
understudied.  Porkoláb and Bári did the pioneer thesis about the HUNSOF.  Their thesis 
analyzes how the strategic environment changes in the nature of war, and how 
characteristics of potential adversaries might affect the development of the HUNSOF.  
However, the thesis of Porkoláb and Bári also has an implicit limitation:  It describes 
only the development of the HUNSOF between 2003 and 2005.  Nevertheless, their 
contribution to the scientific study of one of the major ongoing HDF development 
projects is undeniable since Porkoláb and Bári have framed the evolving characteristics 
of the HUNSOF.  Their thesis was based upon scientific standards, and is considered to 
be the first chapter of the book about the development of the HUNSOF.  This thesis adds 
the second chapter to the book that does not simply record, but also analyzes, phase one 
of the development of the HUNSOF.  The third chapter of the book that covers phase two 
of the development process of the HUNSOF invites the analysis of Hungarian subject 
matter experts. 
Additionally, after completing their pioneering thesis, Porkoláb has remained 
committed to the development of the HUNSOF in practice.  He first was assigned to lead 
the Special Operations Section within J-3 of the JFC from spring 2007, and he assisted in 
the establishment of the HUNSOF.  Thereafter, he was assigned as ISAF Special 
Operations Component Command Element liaison officer to the Afghan National 
Security Forces in Afghanistan in December 2008, with the additional task of managing 
the deployment of the first Special Operations Task Unit of the 34th ‘László Bercsényi’ 
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Special Operations Battalion in Afghanistan.12  And finally, upon finishing his tour in 
Afghanistan, Porkoláb was assigned to command the 34th ‘László Bercsényi’ Special 
Operations Battalion in April 2009.  Bári was assigned to the Hungarian Ministry of 
Defense and assumed other tasks. 
The master’s thesis of Porkoláb and Bári has provided the foundation for the 
development of the HUNSOF.  Their first premise is that because of Hungary’s NATO 
and EU membership, Hungary will be involved in dealing with unconventional 
challenges that characterize the current international arena.  Logically, therefore, 
Hungary needs capabilities to cope with unconventional threats.  Their second premise is 
that available Hungarian general purpose forces are not experienced enough to meet 
unconventional challenges, so Porkoláb and Bári propose generating a special operations 
capability that would be prepared to effectively deal with unconventional threats.  Their 
premises have been analyzed and accepted.  The HUNSOF has been developed based on 
their vision. 
Their third premise is that successful special operations depend on three 
attributes:  Clear national and theater strategic objectives; effective command, control, 
communications, computer, and intelligence support; and a force trained, equipped, and 
organized specifically to conduct special operations.  Based on their premise, all relevant 
segments of the HUNSOF were developed, taking into account two national strategic 
papers:  The National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy.  Since the 
HUNSOF has been designed to operate mostly as part of a multinational unit, the AJP-3.5 
Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations and MC 437/1 NATO Special Operations 
Policy for NATO, and the EU Special Operations Policy and Guidelines from the EU, 
were also taken into consideration.  In order to make it more effective, Hungary has fine-
tuned the national and theater strategic objectives; advanced command, control, 
communications, computer, and intelligence support; and updated the training, 
equipment, and organization of its SOF. 
                                                 
12 Special Operations Task Unit is the NATO terminology for the smallest special operations unit of 4-
16 operators.  The equivalent U.S. terminology is Operational Detachment Alpha.  This thesis consistently 
uses the NATO terminology. 
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To achieve and maintain effective command, control, communications, computer, 
and intelligence support, Porkoláb and Bári argue that the Defense Staff should exercise 
direct command over HUNSOF through a newly designed Special Forces Coordination 
Office.  They propose the purposes of that office are to direct the HUNSOF development 
process; to interact with all operational level national agencies and the international SOF 
community; to keep the strategic level updated, correctly informed and provided with 
expert advice; and to provide control of HUNSOF during operations.  The HUNSOF was 
assigned under the direct command of the JFC in 2007.  The Special Operations Section 
within J-3 of the JFC was established in March 2007, and writes regulations and deals 
with operational planning.  For effective and correct usage of SOF, Porkoláb and Bári 
also propose creating a pool of “managers” who bridge the gap between SOF operators 
and senior civilian and military executives by highlighting the capabilities and limitations 
of SOF.  Upon their proposal, staff officers were assigned to conduct SOF-related studies 
in the United States starting in 2008, so that upon returning to Hungary they would 
become these managers.  To integrate the HUNSOF into the international SOF 
community, Porkoláb and Bári recommend deploying liaison detachments to SOF 
components of NATO and EU headquarters.  One liaison officer was assigned to the 
NATO Special Operations Coordination Centre (NSCC) to serve as a bridge between the 
Hungarian, NATO, and the EU SOF communities in July 2006.13  One non-
commissioned officer was assigned to NATO Special Operations Coordination Center in 
September 2009 to reinforce the liaison officer.  As the previous section noted, however, 
the command and control element of the HUNSOF at the strategic level is still to be 
established. 
Porkoláb and Bári propose three groups of tasks for the HUNSOF.  Their 
proposed pool of primary tasks includes unconventional warfare, combating terrorism, 
special reconnaissance, and direct action.  They also suggest collateral tasks: human 
intelligence, information operations, and psychological operations.  In addition, they 
                                                 
13 NATO Special Operations Coordination Centre moved from Stuttgart, Germany to Supreme 
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) Mons, Belgium during the summer of 2007. 
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recommend considering counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and civil-
military cooperation as possible tasks.  Based on their visionary analysis, the following 
tasks were finally assigned for the HUNSOF.  These primary tasks include military 
assistance (first priority), special reconnaissance, and direct action.  Additional tasks are: 
participating in the military tasks of countering terrorism, the proliferation of 
conventional and unconventional weapons, and organized crime abroad; participating in 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; joining in peacetime and wartime search and 
rescue missions; supporting information operations; protecting and securing high-value 
targets; and executing hostage rescue missions. 
Finally, Porkoláb and Bári provide the framework for recruitment, selection, 
training, and retention of the HUNSOF.  They set the standards for selection; describe the 
underlying characteristics and skill sets that special operations operators have to obtain; 
highlight the necessity of language, cultural, and international training and joint 
exercises; and underline essential measures that military leadership have to take in order 
to be able to retain HUNSOF operators.  Their views are reflected in the provision that 
schedules the development process of the HUNSOF in the short- and mid-terms.14  
Additionally, István Soós has recently generated a master’s thesis that covers the training 
aspect of the HUNSOF.15 
This section reviewed the thesis of Porkoláb and Bári, which provided an 
excellent framework to the development of the HUNSOF.  Most of their 
recommendations and suggestions were further studied, found feasible, endorsed, and 
finally realized.  Porkoláb has remained committed to the development of the HUNSOF 
in practice.  He shaped the HUNSOF first as Head of the Special Operations Section, and 
he has been the commander of the 34th ‘László Bercsényi’ Special Operations Battalion 
as of 2009.  Porkoláb has been one of the Founding Fathers of the HUNSOF.  This 
                                                 
14 Lieutenant-General László Tömböl, “A Magyar Honvédség Összhaderőnemi Parancsnokság 
Parancsnokának Intézkedése a Különleges Műveleti Képesség Rövid- és Középtávú Fejlesztésére, 
Reference no. MH ÖHP PK 345/2008,” Joint Forces Command of the Hungarian Defense Forces, October, 
29, 2008. 
15 István Soós, Changes in Hungarian SOF Training, (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 2009). 
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section described the recent development of the HUNSOF between 2003 and 2009.  
However, in order to understand the inducements of the development process of the 
HUNSOF, a more extensive overview should be considered.  The next section thus 
recounts the time just prior to the onset of World War II and studies the past of the 
Hungarian Special Forces. 
C. HISTORY OF THE HUNGARIAN SPECIAL FORCES 
1. World War II Period 
The Hungarian military leadership realized the trend of European powers 
intensively developing special military units, especially airborne infantry and special 
forces, by the late 1930s.  The Soviet Union, for example, often described as a great 
power that was not prepared for World War II, possessed about 50,000 trained airborne 
infantrymen by 1937.16  Germany established its first parachutist regiment (about 600 
men strong) in January 1936.17 
In 1938, the Hungarian Ministry of Defense allocated 1.8 million pengő for the 
establishment of a parachutist company.18  The Honvéd Parachutist Company was 
hurriedly set up in the town of Pápa on October 1, 1939, as part of Hungary’s military 
preparation on the eve of World War II.19  As a result of an increase in personnel by 
August 30, 1940, the I. Royal Hungarian Honvéd Parachutist Battalion, the first modern 
Hungarian special military unit, was established with the main task of carrying out 
subversion.  The battalion was part of the first wave of joint German-Hungarian-Italian 
forces that assaulted Yugoslavia in April 1941.  The Hungarian objective of the offensive 
                                                 
16 Ferenc Szentnémedy, “A függőleges átkarolás kérdéséhez,” Magyar Katonai Szemle, 1937, issue 2, 
104. 
17 Christopher Ailsby, Hitler's Sky Warriors: German Paratroopers in Action, 1939-1945 
(Spellmount, Limited Publishers, 2000), 26. 
18 The indicated cost excludes the procurement of the transport airplanes.  Gábor Sztojalovszky, A 
Magyar Királyi Honvédség Ejtőernyős Alakulata Megalakulásától 1945-ig (Budapest, Miklós Zrínyi 
National Defense University, 1998), 17. 
19 Until 1945, the Hungarian land forces were called the Royal Hungarian Army = “Magyar Királyi 
Honvédség.”  The term “Honvédség” refers to the structure of the land forces as a whole while the term 
“Honvéd” refers to any unit of the Royal Hungarian Army.  Today, the term “Honvédség” refers not only 
to the land forces, but the defense forces as a whole:  “Magyar Honvédség” = Hungarian Defense Forces. 
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operation was to seize the region called Bácska from Yugoslavia.  The operation also 
marked Hungary’s entry into World War II.  The battalion’s objective was to seize and 
hold a bridge of importance until ground forces relieved them.  Even though the objective 
was achieved, the battalion’s first deployment by parachute brought its first catastrophe at 
the same time:  One of the four transport planes crashed shortly after taking off, killing 
16 paratroopers, including the battalion commander and the bulk of his staff.20 
The battalion carried out one more deployment by parachute in the Eastern 
Carpathian Mountains on July 6, 1941.  The objective of air-dropping supplies was also 
successfully achieved.  For the rest of the war, the battalion fought in support of the 
general purpose forces fighting against partisan and Soviet troops on the Eastern Front.  
Even though the idea had emerged in 1941, lack of resources did not allow the 
establishment of another battalion until October 1944.  The two battalions were then 
structured into a parachutist regiment.  The fragmented regiment finally ceased fighting 
on May 11, 1945, in the territory of Austria, and it was disbanded at the same time.  
During World War II, the parachutist unit suffered forty-five percent casualties, and 
many of the survivors became prisoners of war. 
Today, the multinational Heavy Airlift Wing, equipped with three C-17 
Globemaster III transport aircrafts, is stationed in Pápa, the first hometown of the 
parachutist battalion.  The multinational Heavy Airlift Wing is part of the NATO 
Strategic Airlift Capability Program.21 
                                                 
20 Miklós Zrínyi National Defense University, Katonai Ejtőernyőzés Magyarországon Egyetemi 
Jegyzet, 2. Fejezet, László Simon, A Magyar Katonai Ejtõernyõzés 1945- ig, (Budapest: Miklós Zrínyi 
National Defense University), 15.  Other sources put the number of fatalities between 15 and 20.  The 
reason for the variation is that some counted only the paratroopers, while others added in the four airmen 
who were part of the aircrew. 
21 Strategic airlift has been a long-standing critical shortfall for NATO.  The Strategic Airlift 
Capability initiative was first announced in September 2006, and approved by the North Atlantic Council 
on 20 June 2007.  The participants include ten NATO nations: Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, and the United States; and two Partnership for Peace 
nations: Finland and Sweden.  Membership in the initiative remains open to other countries.  For further 
information, see http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50105.htm. 
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2. Cold War Period 
Victorious powers limited Hungary’s military capabilities after World War II.  
Consequently, even if the democratically elected government had wanted to, it was not in 
the position to reestablish the parachutist battalion.  In 1948, the Communist Party took 
over Hungary.  Enjoying the protection of the Soviet Union, the Communists did not care 
for the imposed limitations to military capabilities anymore, and they launched a wide-
scale and costly militarization process in 1951.  Fearing a threat from the Western 
powers, Hungary first doubled the manpower of its defense forces to 135,000, and the 
manpower exceeded 200,000 by 1952.22 
Militarization, however, consumed a great amount of Hungary’s financial 
resources.  Hungary spent 20 percent of its budget on the defense forces in the fiscal year 
of 1950:  2,050,000,000 forint of Hungary’s 10,204,000,000 forint budget was allocated 
for the military.23 
The regime also reestablished the battalion as the 62th Detached Parachutist 
Battalion, this time in the town of Székesfehérvár in October 1951.  The same year, the 
Communist regime forced all commissioned and non-commissioned officers who were 
veterans of World War II to retire, resulting in an enormous loss of expertise. 
The growing military spending soon exceeded Hungary’s means and capabilities, 
and exhausted the country.  Consequently, the regime prepared a force reduction plan in 
1953, at the same time cutting the military expenditure for 1954. 
In his article, Lőrinc Dombi claims that the high sustainment costs of the 
parachutist battalion contributed to its disbandment of on November 30, 1954, as part of 
the disarmament.24  Another plausible reason for its disbandment is that the Communists 
saw the parachutist battalion as a capability that could easily turn against their already 
unstable regime, and, therefore, they considered the battalion a possible threat.  Even 
                                                 
22 Dr. Lajos Hajma, A Katonai Felderítés és Hírszerzés Története Egyetemi Jegyzet (Budapest: Miklós 
Zrínyi National Defense University, Department of Intelligence, 2001), 159–160. 
23 Hajma, A Katonai Felderítés és Hírszerzés, 159–160. 
24 Lőrinc Dombi, “60 Év Selyemszárnyakon,” Ejtőernyős Tájékoztató, 1999, vol. 23, issue 3, 6. 
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though the popular revolution in 1956 supports the hypothesis that the Communist regime 
had not consolidated yet, there is no evidence that proves the battalion was disbanded 
because of the Communist sense of fear.  Nonetheless, the disbandment went hand-in- 
hand with the loss of valuable expertise, experience, knowledge, equipment, and 
infrastructure. 
The revolution of 1956 was quickly defeated by Soviet Forces, and by the time 
the Kádár-regime reconsolidated the Communist dictatorship, the parachutist battalion 
was reestablished again in the town of Székesfehérvár in 1959.  Today, the Joint Forces 
Command is stationed in Székesfehérvár, the second hometown of the parachutist 
battalion. 
The battalion relocated to the town of Szolnok, its current location, and was 
renamed the 34th Long-range Reconnaissance Battalion, where it received its later well-
known “MN 3100” codename in 1963.  It took decades for the battalion to recover from 
its first two troubled decades (fighting in the war, enduring two disbandments, and 
undergoing one relocation) and to regenerate the lost expertise and knowledge.  
Nevertheless, the battalion endured and has established its reputation as a highly-trained 
unit, capable of being deployed anytime during the coming decades, during which time 
the Hungarian People’s Army lost its prestige in the society, its morale went down, and 
its Russian-made military technology became obsolete.  Yet, in his master’s thesis, 
Arnold Koltai describes these recovery decades in the history of the battalion, not as the 
period of success, but of neglect: 
Although they are trained to conduct operational and strategic 
reconnaissance and are special operations capable, neither their knowledge 
nor their capabilities have ever been used to an optimum level in 
supporting military efforts protecting Hungary’s national interests.  In fact, 
they have been somehow neglected.  Although their special training and 
espirit de corps have made them the real elite of the Hungarian Army, very 
few in the political or military leadership recognize the opportunities these 
units offer in peacetime.  Military and political officials in key decision 
making positions do not seem to be aware of what these units are capable, 
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therefore, no plans have been made for the employment of SRF [Special 
Reconnaissance Forces] in operations other than in wartime.25 
Even though the military alert status was raised for the battalion during the Cuban Missile 
Crisis in 1962 and it participated in the management of frequent flood crises, the battalion 
was never employed to fight during the Cold War. 
3. Post-Cold War Period 
In stark contrast with the stability of the Cold War, during which the Hungarian 
Communist regimes did not have to employ the battalion, the post-Cold War period has 
seen “small wars” in the Western Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan, which have led to the 
democratic Hungarian regimes oftentimes deploying the battalion. 
As the Soviet Union began losing influence over its satellite countries, Hungary 
began diverging from its “Big Brother” during the 1980s.  As a result of this break-away 
process, radical changes happened in Hungary:  The democratic and multi-party political 
system was restored in 1989, free elections were held in 1990, and the last Soviet troops 
left the country in 1991. 
The battalion was renamed after Count László Bercsényi in 1990.  When radical 
changes also hit neighboring Yugoslavia in 1991, the newly structured Hungarian 
Defense Forces deployed the battalion to carry out border security tasks along the 
southern border between Hungary and Yugoslavia.  By the time Hungary joined NATO 
in 1999, the crisis on the territory of former Yugoslavia had reached Kosovo.  Elements 
of the battalion were among the first NATO troops deployed to Kosovo.  In 2002, a 
platoon was also deployed to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. 
In 2003, the political and military leadership decided to establish the HUNSOF.  
The HDF assigned the 34th ‘László Bercsényi’ Long-range Reconnaissance Battalion to 
be transformed to a special operation battalion in two phases.  The 34th ‘László 
Bercsényi’ Special Operations Battalion was established September 1, 2005, and the 
                                                 
25 Arnold Koltai, The Hungarian Army Special Reconnaissance Forces in Peace Operations (Fort 
Leavenworth: The U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2001), 48–49. 
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long-range reconnaissance battalion was transformed into a special forces battalion in 
phase one.  In 2006, the first qualification course assisted by a Mobile Training Team 
was held and the battalion also reached the Initial Operational Capability.  Chapter IV 
studies phase one.  Additionally, one company of the battalion was transferred under 
NATO ISAF command in Afghanistan in 2004 and 2008, and three rotations of one 
Hungarian Special Operations Task Unit in 2009, while some elements were transferred 
under NATO Training Mission–Iraq (NTM–I) command in Iraq in 2005.  The 
deployment of the Hungarian Special Operations Task Units in Afghanistan is analyzed 
in Chapter V.  Figure 2 shows the insignia of the Hungarian Defense Forces 34th ‘László 
Bercsényi’ Special Operations Battalion. 
 
 
Figure 2. Insignia of the Hungarian Defense Forces 34th ‘László Bercsényi’ Special 
Operations Battalion 
Even though the battalion has gained valuable experience in working by, through, 
and with the Iraqi and Afghan population and Security Forces in the last couple of years, 
there is still a lot to do in phase two of the HUNSOF development project: the special 
forces battalion is to be transformed into a special operations battalion and its cooperation 
with units in the HUNSOF capability package is to be strengthened.  A Special Operation 
Task Group will achieve full operational capability by the end of 2010.  Table 1 




Historical Milestones of the Hungarian Defense Forces 
34th 'László Bercsényi' Special Operations Battalion 
 
Period Year Event Size Location Profile 
1939 Establishment Company 
1940 Establishment 
1941-1945 Engagement in World War II 
1941 Deployment in Bácska 














War 1963 Relocation to Szolnok, 
Reorganization to Long-range 
Reconnaissance Battalion 
1991-1992 Engagement in Border Security Operations
1999 Deployment in Kosovo 
2002 Deployment in the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia 




2005 Transformation to Special Operations 
Battalion 
2006 First Qualification Course, 
Initial Operational Capability 
2007 Deployment in Iraq 
2008 Deployment in Afghanistan 









Table 1.   Historical Milestones of the Hungarian Defense Forces 34th ‘László 
Bercsényi’ Special Operations Battalion 
4. Legendary Figures 
The battalion honors the name of some legendary figures of the Hungarian 
military past.  The namesake of the battalion, Count László Bercsényi (1689–1778), was 
also the founder of the modern French cavalry.  He established the warfare style of the 
23 
 
Hungarian light cavalry, the Hussars.  In recognition of his services, Count Bercsényi was 
promoted to Marshal of France the highest rank of the French Army. 
Major Árpád Bertalan (1898–1941) received the merit title of “Vitéz” in 
recognition of his World War I services.26  As first commander of the I. Royal Hungarian 
Honvéd Parachutist Battalion, he was killed in action while leading his unit when the 
transport plane crashed during the assault against Yugoslavia on April 12, 1941. 
Captain Károly Hüse (1940–1978) was and is a sport parachutist legend.  He was 
killed while performing his 6,263th parachutist jump.27  His portrait was inaugurated at 
the base of the battalion in 2009.  In posthumous remembrance of Major Hüse, young 
generations of parachutist sportsmen and women come together for one of the biggest 
parachutist sport events in Hungary, the annual ’Károly Hüse’ Parachutist Memorial 
Competition. 
Colonel (Retired) Kálmán Furkó (1947–) is a brand.  Shihan Furkó (7 dan) has 
been teaching close combat and Kyokushin Karate for generations.  He was also deputy 
commander of the battalion at the time he retired. 
This section studied the history of the parachutist/reconnaissance battalion.  The 
next section summarizes the findings of Chapter II. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
A military is one instrument of statecraft.  Democracies place great emphasis on 
developing the legal framework for the employment of their defense forces.  The 
Constitution of the Republic of Hungary and the National Defense Law adequately frame 
the employment of the Hungarian Defense Forces within and beyond the boundaries of 
the Republic of Hungary.  Furthermore, the Paper of the Chief of Defense Staff of the 
Ministry of Defense adequately regulated the employment of the HUNSOF capability 
package within and beyond the boundaries of the Republic of Hungary. 
                                                 
26 The term “Vitéz” refers to the merit title of “valiant.” 
27 Szolnoki Honvéd Ejtőernyős Sportegyesület, “Hüse Károly Életpálya,” SzHES, 
http://www.szhese.hu/huse/huse.html (accessed August 8, 2009). 
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Constructive cooperation between academics and practitioners is vital for 
improving and adjusting the defense architectures to ever-changing challenges.  Putting 
into practice the vision of Porkoláb and Bári regarding the HUNSOF is an example of a 
fruitful collaboration between academic and operational circles.  The thesis of Porkoláb 
and Bári has been considered to be the theoretical foundation of the HUNSOF and has 
been used as a guide for developing the HUNSOF.  The HUNSOF has also benefitted 
from Porkoláb’s commitment in the practical phase of the development process. 
As we have seen, the history of the parachutist/long-range reconnaissance 
battalion included frequent deployments during World War II.  Nevertheless, most of the 
development of the parachutist/long-range reconnaissance battalion from its 
establishment in 1940 until its reorganization to special operation battalion in 2005 
occurred during peacetime. 
What are the optimal conditions for building a new military capability?  Is it 
worthwhile to build a capability during decades of peace without testing it in real action, 
or is it better to employ it often, even if it is not fully completed?  It is possible to take 
care of every detail that might present itself while developing a capability in peacetime.  
Frequent deployments highlight weak points that can then be adjusted and, therefore, 
serve to improve the capability.  There are pros and cons for both peacetime development 
and development through combat deployments.  These are only two of the questions the 
history of the parachutist/long-range reconnaissance battalion—the predecessor of the 
Hungarian Special Forces and the core of the HUNSOF—raise and invite Hungarian 
subject matter experts to analyze.  The next chapter studies possible strategic command 
and control element for the HUNSOF. 
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III. DETERMINING THE OPTIMAL STRATEGIC COMMAND 
AND CONTROL ELEMENT FOR THE HUNGARIAN 
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 
Four of the HUNSOF units are concentrated in the town of Szolnok: the 34th 
‘László Bercsényi’ Special Operations Battalion, the special forces of the HUNSOF; the 
25/88 Light Mixed Battalion, the land element of the HUNSOF combat support forces; 
the 86th Szolnok Helicopter Base, the air element of the HUNSOF combat support forces; 
and the Peace Support Training Centre, one of the three HUNSOF combat service 
support elements.  The first three units are located in the same base.  The concentration of 
these units, representing the core HUNSOF capabilities, raises the question of 
establishing some kind of oversight or managerial structure in the town of Szolnok. 
This chapter is a theoretical exercise that compares three options for the strategic 
command and control element of HUNSOF.  The first section studies the possible 
organizational designs of stewardship for the HUNSOF.  The second section outlines the 
recommendations for determining the optimal stewardship for the HUNSOF, and the 
third section summarizes the findings of Chapter III. 
The leadership of all involved units in the HUNSOF capability package represents 
the tactical command and control element of the HUNSOF.  The Special Operations 
Section within J-3 of the Joint Forces Command is the operational command and control 
element of the HUNSOF.  There is no strategic command and control element of the 
HUNSOF.  The NATO SOF Study “represents a compilation of research and analysis 
intended to provide a reference point to inform the continued optimization of national and 
NATO SOF.”28  The NATO SOF Study accumulates knowledge on SOF from the 
following sixteen NATO member countries: Canada, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Romania,  
 
 
                                                 
28 NSCC, NATO SOF Study, 3. 
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Slovakia, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States; and one non-NATO 
country, Austria.  The NATO SOF Study underlines the need for distinct special 
operations oversight or management structure: 
Despite the differences among the development of the SOF within each 
nation, all NATO members agree that some form of oversight or 
managerial structure is necessary to serve as a custodian for the SOF units 
within their defence establishments, and to play a role similar to the one 
that the military service chiefs perform for conventional forces.29 
Therefore, the HUNSOF also needs some kind of oversight or managerial structure.  But 
what kind of organizational design would be best for HUNSOF? 
International examples and allocation of core HUNSOF capabilities would 
support the establishment of the Hungarian Special Operations Command.  According to 
the NATO SOF Study, Canada, France, Italy, Poland, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States have joint special operations commands.30  So why does Hungary not 
follow the international trend of either organizing special operations forces under a 
separate special operations oversight mechanism, or establishing a special operations 
service?  The current allocation of core HUNSOF capabilities also supports the 
establishment of a Hungarian Special Operations Command.  Since the 34th ‘László 
Bercsényi’ Special Operations Battalion, the 25/88 Light Mixed Battalion, the 86th 
Szolnok Helicopter Base, and the Peace Support Training Centre are all located in the 
town of Szolnok, the Hungarian Special Operations Command could easily be established 
there with little additional investment in manpower and infrastructure of the four core 
units of the HUNSOF. 
Additionally, the idea of establishing a Special Operations Command is not new 
in Hungary.  Kovács was among the first who recommended the idea of establishing a 
Special Operations Command for further consideration.31  Porkoláb and Bári went further 
                                                 
29 NSCC, NATO SOF Study, 19–20. 
30 NSCC, NATO SOF Study, 24. 
31 Kovács, A Különleges Műveleti Erők, 73. 
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by recommending “a centralized and joint Special Forces service.”32  Previous academic 
studies, however, have not analyzed the strengths or weaknesses of establishing a 
Hungarian Special Operations Command or other possible organizational designs for the 
strategic command and control element of HUNSOF.  This chapter fills this gap and 
provides an initial analysis.  The next section studies the possible organizational designs 
of stewardship for the HUNSOF. 
A. POSSIBLE ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNS 
The NATO SOF Study provides reference points to the question of how to 
determine the optimal organizational design for stewardship of a national SOF.  First and 
foremost, the NATO SOF Study states: 
Each NATO member will have to decide which organizational model 
would be optimal for providing the appropriate stewardship of their SOF 
within their defence establishment.  Since NATO member nations are at 
different stages of their evolutionary journey to build and enhance their 
SOF, a single organizational model is not applicable to all.33 
Moreover, the NATO SOF Study has developed three special operations oversight models 
from the existing examples of NATO member countries, and they are offered for further 
consideration: a National Military Staff Element, a Component Command, and a Military 
Service.  But which of the three organizational designs would best fit the HUNSOF?  To 
make a proper decision, the strengths and weaknesses of the three SOF stewardship 
organizational design models described in the NATO SOF Study should be analyzed.34 
A Special Operations Service is the most ambitious organizational design for the 
stewardship of any SOF.  A Special Operations Service provides a high level of 
autonomy in developing and sustaining SOF by managing policy, doctrine, training, 
resourcing, acquisition, personnel, and logistics.  By controlling all SOF aspects, a 
Special Operations Service could employ great influence and foster the emergence of a 
                                                 
32 Porkoláb and Bári, Enhancing National Security, 129. 
33 NSCC, NATO SOF Study, 29–30. 
34 NSCC, NATO SOF Study, 22–30. 
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coherent and integrated joint force, SOF culture, and professional environment, and 
employ great influence.  Creating a Special Operations Service requires, however, critical 
mass of SOF and assets, and an advanced evolution in terms of both time and the amount 
of gathered experience.  Furthermore, a Special Operations Service contributes to the 
rivalry between traditional services, especially for resources.  Poland has, for instance, a 
separate SOF service with an ambitious goal of attaining 3,000 SOF personnel by 2012.35  
In comparison, the U.S. Special Operations Command – which is not a service – employs 
approximately 54,000 personnel.36 
A Special Operations Component Command represents a moderately ambitious 
organizational design for the stewardship of SOF.  A Special Operations Component 
Command provides a medium level of autonomy by defining SOF policy and doctrine, 
and establishing requirements for training, resourcing, acquisition, personnel, and 
logistics.  By controlling some SOF aspects, a Special Operations Component Command 
could foster standardization and unity of effort among service SOF units, and employ 
some influence.  Creating a Special Operations Component Command requires sufficient 
mass of SOF and assets, and some experience in developing and employing SOF.  A 
Special Operations Component Command heavily relies, however, on traditional services 
during the pre-deployment period because it does not exercise command over SOF units 
until they deploy on operations.  Canada, France, Italy, Poland, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States have joint special operations commands. 
A National Military Staff Element for Special Operations represents the least 
ambitious organizational design for the stewardship of SOF.  A National Military Staff 
Element for Special Operations provides a low level of autonomy by coordinating SOF 
plans, doctrine, training, and acquisition.  By controlling only a few SOF aspects, a 
National Military Staff Element for Special Operations is still able to represent the 
                                                 
35 The Polish Special Operations Command was established January 1, 2007.  At the same time, SOF 
became the fourth service in addition to the Air Forces, Land Forces, and the Navy of the Polish Defense 
Forces.  Author’s Interview with a Polish Special Forces Major, wishing to remain anonymous, Naval 
Postgraduate School, October 21, 2009. 
36 Admiral Eric T. Olson, Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, Presentation at Naval 
Postgraduate School, October 27, 2009. 
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interest of national SOF within the national defense establishment and employs some 
influence.  Even though a National Military Staff Element for Special Operations requires 
relatively few SOF units – since parent services retain control over their SOF units – it 
only has coordinating authority.  The remaining NATO member countries that have 
contributed to the NATO SOF Study have national military staff elements for special 
operations. 
This section discussed options for the strategic command and control element of 
HUNSOF.  The next section provides the recommendations for determining the optimal 
strategic command and control element for the HUNSOF. 
B. INITIAL ANALYSIS 
This chapter provides an initial analysis to suggest to Hungarian academics and 
military planners to further study models provided by the NATO SOF Study, and generate 
other viable options that could contribute to defining the optimal strategic command and 
control element for the HUNSOF.  Based on reference points of the NATO SOF Study, 
this thesis argues that the establishment of a Hungarian Special Operations Command and 
the creation of a Hungarian Special Operations Service are too ambitious and inopportune 
in both the short and mid-term for three reasons: 
First, the HUNSOF contains neither sufficient mass of resources for establishing a 
Special Operations Command, nor for creating a Special Operations Service.  In addition, 
the political and military leadership do not have enough experience in either developing 
or employing SOF. 
Second, establishing a Special Operations Command would contradict the current 
organizational design trend of eliminating a multi-service command system and unifying 
operational-level command and control elements.  Uniquely, the HDF JFC was 
established as the successor of the Land Force Command and the Air Force Command, 
which were abolished.  The HDF JFC took over certain tasks of the Joint Forces Logistics 
and Support Command, the Signal and Informatics Command of the Hungarian Defense 
Forces, the Operation Command Headquarters, and that of the Medical Command of the 
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Hungarian Defense Forces (these latter were also abolished) effective January 1, 2007.37  
Establishing a separate Special Operations Command would conflict with this 
organizational design trend. 
Third, no existing strategic military plan includes the establishment of the Special 
Operations Command or a Special Operations Service.  In October 2007, the Hungarian 
political and military leadership announced that the reform of the defense forces that 
started in 1990 had come to an end, and the main focus would now be on the 
modernization and replacement of aging Soviet technology.38  No more existing units are 
to be disbanded, or new ones established.  After such an announcement, and because all 
the scheduled changes were completed during the defense reform, establishing a Special 
Operations Command or a Special Operations Service would create confusion.  
Therefore, any plan attempting to address the strategic command and control element of 
HUNSOF must be found within the existing force structure. 
Bearing in mind these three considerations, military planners are outlining an 
oversight mechanism for the HUNSOF that is modeled after a National Military Staff 
Element for Special Operations, the least ambitious of the organizational designs for 
stewardship of SOF.  Military planners are working on a plan that outlines a Special 
Operations Section at the Department for Operation and Training of the Ministry of 
Defense.  According to the plans, the Special Operations Section at the Department for 
Operation and Training of the Ministry of Defense will be responsible for SOF plans and 
doctrine and be manned in 2010.  Yet, subsequent years might prove that the HDF JFC is 
not the ultimate operational command structure and a service-based command 
configuration could be reinstituted.  This situation could also provide opportunities for 
the establishment of a Special Operations Command or a Special Operations Service.  
                                                 
37 The Joint Forces Command operates under the direct service subordination of the Chief of Defense 
Staff.  The Joint Forces Command of the Hungarian Defense Forces is a medium level command and 
control military organization with the legal status of a higher operational unit.  Ministry of Defense, 
Hungarian Defense Forces, “The Joint Forces Command of the Hungarian Defense Forces,” 
http://www.hm.gov.hu/army (accessed July, 3, 2008). 
38 Ministry of Defense, Hungarian Defense Forces, “HDF Reform Completed,” 
http://www.hm.gov.hu/news/hdf_reform_completed (accessed September 14, 2009). 
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This means the HUNSOF still has time to generate more expertise, knowledge, and 
experience until a more ambitious strategic command and control element could be 
established.  Internal preparations can last, however, a long time.  For instance, the U.S. 
Special Operations Command was activated in 1987, after the U.S. SOF had served for 
decades. 
This thesis provides recommendations to the establishment of the strategic 
command and control element of the HUNSOF in Chapter VII.  This section outlined the 
recommendations for determining the optimal strategic command and control element for 
the HUNSOF. The next section summarizes the findings of Chapter III. 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Every military branch and service requires some kind of oversight or management 
structure of tactical, operational, and strategic command and control elements.  So does 
SOF.  The tactical and operational command and control elements of the HUNSOF are in 
place, but their strategic element is still missing.  The NATO SOF Study provides three 
oversight models: the National Military Staff Element, the Component Command, and 
the Military Service.  The Military Staff Element represents the least ambitious, and the 
Military Service represents the most ambitious organizational design for stewardship of 
SOF.  This thesis argues that the establishment of a Special Operations Command and the 
creation of a Special Operations Service are too ambitious and inopportune in the short 
and mid-terms because the number of the HUNSOF personnel does not reach either 
sufficient or critical mass for these two organizational designs.  In addition, the HDF 
eliminates rather than establishes service commands. 
Military planners are working on the establishment of a Special Operations 
Section at the strategic level that is modeled after the least ambitious of the organizational 
design for stewardship of SOF, the National Military Staff Element.  Nevertheless, it is 
worthwhile to further analyze the best international practices to determine the optimal 
organizational design for the strategic command and control element of SOF.  This thesis 
provides recommendations to optimize the strategic command and control element of 
HUNSOF in the short term in Chapter V.  The next chapter studies the development of 
















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
33 
 
IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE HUNGARIAN SPECIAL 
OPERATIONS BATTALION BETWEEN 2003 AND 2009 
The HDF scheduled the development of the HUNSOF in two phases.  Units 
missing from the HUNSOF capability package were to be established in phase one.  The 
Civilian-Military Cooperation and Psychological Operations Centre and the 25/88 Light 
Mixed Battalion were established September 1, 2004.  The 34th ‘László Bercsényi’ 
Special Operations Battalion was established September 1, 2005, and the long-range 
reconnaissance battalion was transformed into a special forces battalion in phase one.  
This chapter studies that transformation. 
The strengthening of the cooperation between units in the HUNSOF capability 
package will be effected in phase two.  For example, the annual Exercise Direction of 
Action and the Afghan theater provide opportunities to practice cooperation among these 
units.  The 34th ‘László Bercsényi’ Special Operations Battalion is being transformed into 
a special operations battalion in phase two. 
The first section of this chapter discusses Hungarian national interests in 
developing SOF.  The second section studies the major challenges the HDF faced while 
developing their SOF. The third section summarizes the findings of Chapter IV. 
A. NATIONAL INTEREST IN DEVELOPING SPECIAL OPERATIONS 
FORCES 
The NATO SOF Study mentions some SOF mission failures that caused problems 
for those who endorsed the missions: 
Painful experiences in Munich, Ma’a lot, Malta, Desert One, and Beslan 
provide just a few illustrations of the price for inadequate preparation to 
face the inevitable challenges all governments will eventually encounter.39 
 
                                                 
39 NSCC, NATO SOF Study, 17. 
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Alternatively, the successful U.S. SOF deployment in Afghanistan between October and 
December 2001 notably contributed to President George W. Bush’s high job approval 
ratings, at that time.40  Moreover, the NATO SOF Study also emphasizes that SOF usually 
operates in politically sensitive environments: 
SOF operates outside the realm of conventional operations or beyond the 
standard capabilities of conventional forces, thus providing a solution to 
extraordinary circumstances of political interest when no other option is 
available.41 
Being a member of NATO and the EU, Hungary has to proportionally contribute 
to the collective security of those two international organizations.  The HUNSOF was 
considered to be a significant future contribution to the collective security of NATO and 
the EU, and it was perceived that the HUNSOF could fill critical shortfalls in 
multinational Peace Support Operations, which is an important national interest of the 
Republic of Hungary.  Therefore, the political and military leadership endorsed the 
project to develop the HUNSOF in 2003. 
It is likely the political and military leadership supported the development of SOF 
capability because when fully operational, the HUNSOF will be an effective national tool 
with which to counter international terrorism.  The National Military Strategy warns that 
international terrorism may target Hungarian contingents abroad, and critical 
infrastructure in Hungary, as well as international interests in Hungary: 
Terror acts are most likely to target contingents of the Hungarian Defense 
Forces operating in crisis-hit regions.  Since international terrorism 
endeavors to provoke and demonstrate its existence, the threat level of 
some critical infrastructures and NATO and EU facilities and 
organizations located inside Hungary might also increase.42 
                                                 
40 Gallup, “Presidential Approval Ratings - George W. Bush,” Gallup, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/116500/Presidential-Approval-Ratings-George-Bush.aspx (accessed February 
20, 2009). 
41 NSCC, NATO SOF Study, ii. 
42 The Government of the Republic of Hungary, “National Military Strategy of the Republic of 
Hungary,” January 21, 2009, 5. 
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Hungarian citizens could be taken hostage or Hungarian interests at home and 
abroad could be targeted by international terrorist organizations.  Typically, military 
contingents, diplomats, embassies, consulates, and other Hungarian interests abroad are 
exposed to international terrorism.  For example, the Hungarian Embassy in Islamabad 
was on the target list of terrorists who were arrested by Pakistani Security Forces at the 
end of June 2009.43  It is the responsibility of Hungarian intelligence and law 
enforcement agencies to carry out anti- and counter-terrorism tasks inside the boundaries 
of the Republic of Hungary, while the special forces of the Hungarian defense 
establishment perform these tasks abroad.  The HDF assumes purview only for 
supporting tasks in anti- and counter-terrorism. 
Unlike Hungary, counter-terrorism has long been one of the major national 
interests driving the development of special military units in European democracies.  For 
instance, Denmark, Germany, Norway, and Poland have had a strong counter-terrorism 
motivation in developing their Special Military Units. 
Denmark established its Hunter Corps in 1961 so as to have special forces during 
the Cold War.44  Over the decades, the Hunter Corps [Jægerkorpset, JGK] assumed the 
leading role as a national counter-terrorism capability.  It is necessary to have such 
counter- and anti-terrorist capability since the terrorist threat caused by al Qaeda and 
affiliated extremist organizations against Denmark and Danish interests abroad increased 
due to Denmark’s participation in NATO-led operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and 
especially since the Muhammad cartoons crisis in 2005.45 
                                                 
43 On June 24, 2009, the Hungarian MTI news agency announced that Pakistani law enforcement 
agencies foiled planned bomb attacks against western embassies in Islamabad.  The target list of the 
arrested militants included the Embassy of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Norway, South Africa, and 
Sweden.  The Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has confirmed the MTI news.  It should be noted that 
all of the targeted European states deploy troops in Afghanistan.  MTV, “Merényletet Hiúsítottak meg a 
Magyar Nagykövetség Ellen,” MTV, June 24, 2009, 
http://www.hirado.hu/Hirek/2009/06/24/11/Merenyletet_hiusitottak_meg_a_pakisztani_magyar_nagykovet
seg_ellen.aspx (accessed August 12, 2009). 
44 Hæren Jægerkorpset, “About Jægerkorpset, History,” http://forsvaret.dk/JGK/Pages/default.aspx 
(accessed August 22, 2009). 
45 On 30 September 2005, the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten published 12 cartoons of which 6 
depicted Muhammad.  The publication of the cartoons led to protests across the Islamic world, because 
Islam prohibits depiction of Allah and the Prophet. 
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Germany’s motivation for developing its Special Forces Commando was to have 
a rapid response tool that would be capable of dealing with the increasing number of 
terrorist acts against German citizens and interests, as well as emergency situations 
abroad at the beginning of the 1990s.  After asking for the help of Belgium, France, and 
other NATO Allies in evacuating German citizens from Iraq, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, 
and in rescuing German hostages from Rwanda between 1990 and 1994, Germany 
decided to establish its Special Forces Commando [Kommando Spezialkräfte, KSK] to 
tackle these kinds of crisis situations.46 
Attacks carried out by Marxist terrorist groups what David C. Rapoport calls the 
third wave of modern terrorism, starting in the early 1960s, turned the Norwegian 
decision-makers’ attention to the fact that the Norwegian police lacked the capabilities 
with which to protect the oil drilling platforms and gas infrastructures in the North Sea 
that produced a great part of Norway’s revenue from terrorist attacks.47  Norway 
established the Norwegian Defense Special Commando (Forsvarets Spesialkommando 
[FSK]) as a subordinate unit of the Norwegian Army Ranger School (Hærens Jegerskole 
[HJS]) in 1982 to fill this capability gap.  After several structural changes, the Norwegian 
Defense Special Commando is now called the Norwegian Army Special Operations 
Commando (Forsvarets Spesialkommando - Hærens Jegerkommando [FSK/HJK]) and it 
conducts all special operations missions, not just counterterrorism.48 
Poland established the Operational Mobile Response Group (Grupa Reagowania 




                                                 
46 Author’s interview with a German Officer, wishing to remain anonymous, Naval Postgraduate 
School, November 4, 2009. 
47 David C. Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,” in Audrey Kurth Cronin and James 
M. Ludes, editors, Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy (Washington, DC: Georgetown 
University Press, 2004), 46–73. 
48 Author’s interview with a Norwegian Special Operations Forces Officer, wishing to remain 
anonymous, Naval Postgraduate School, October 27, 2009. 
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the security vacuum left by the departing Russian troops, and to deal with home-grown 
and Russian organized crime groups until such a time as the police would be capable of 
taking over that task.49 
Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Norway, and Poland are all European democracies 
and NATO member counties that send troops to the Alliance’s efforts in Afghanistan.  
Counter-terrorism has been one of the major national priorities in developing the Danish 
JGK, the German KSK, the Norwegian FSK/HJK, and the Polish GROM, while the 
development of the Hungarian 34th ‘László Bercsényi’ Special Operations Battalion has 
not had a counter-terrorism motivation.  When endorsing the development of the 
HUNSOF, the military consideration was not to have a national asset to counter 
international terrorism; but rather, to contribute to the collective security of NATO and 
the EU.  This thesis recommends complementing this military consideration to the 
development of the HUNSOF in Chapter VII. 
This section provided the Hungarian national interests of developing a special 
operations battalion.  The next section analyzes the challenges the HDF faced while 
developing their special operations battalion. 
B. CHALLENGES THE HUNGARIAN DEFENSE FORCES FACED WHILE 
DEVELOPING THEIR SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 
The HDF has to manage five major challenges in the course of the development 
and employment of its SOF: to maintain public support for employments abroad, to 
finance the development of its SOF, to meet the force proposal to NATO, to compensate 
the attrition of operators, and to complement lacking expertise. 
                                                 
49 Poland assisted the mass migration of Jews fleeing the former Soviet Union to Israel by providing 
airports for transfer.  This episode is known as Operation Bridge.  As a reprisal to Poland’s assistance to the 
Russian Jews, Hezbollah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine threatened Poland with 
terrorist actions.  Author, Interview with a Polish Special Forces Major. 
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1. Public Support 
In a democracy, military operations abroad require public support.  The National 
Military Strategy emphasizes that the public has to support the Hungarian soldiers’ 
participation in military operations abroad: 
The Hungarian public is sensitive to military and civilian casualties; 
therefore, it is not enough to fight and achieve objectives in the battlefield.  
It is important that the public also receives the Hungarian participation in 
armed conflicts.  This is an especially challenging situation while being 
involved in asymmetric conflicts.50 
In 2007, the military leadership proposed testing the HUNSOF in Afghanistan.  
The deployment of the HUNSOF in Afghanistan was perceived to be more risky than 
other military capabilities; therefore, the political leadership approached the deployment 
of the HUNSOF cautiously because of the risk of losses that might accompany the 
deployment.  The NATO SOF Study profoundly captures the political concerns toward 
special operations: 
In all instances, missions deemed “special” quite often entail significant 
politico-military risks with an entirely different calculus than those 
performed by conventional forces.51 
Since the Hungarian society is not used to facing heavy military losses, serious 
losses in the ranks of the HUNSOF might result in the decline of public support for the 
entire Hungarian military presence in Afghanistan, and for Hungarian soldiers operating 
abroad in general.  In order to maintain public support, the HDF employs information 
campaigns that notify the Hungarian society about relevant events and contribute to a 
better understanding of the activity of the Hungarian military forces deployed in 
Afghanistan, including the HUNSOF, other ISAF Troop Contributing Nations, and the 
efforts of the international community. 
There is a growing body of literature that discusses how the degree of concern 
over casualties is a function of declining public support for military operations abroad.  
                                                 
50 Government of Hungary, National Military Strategy, 9. 
51 NSCC, NATO SOF Study, 8. 
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Recalling the U.S. wars in Korea and Vietnam, Richard Betts claims in his article that 
factors such as “casualties in an inconclusive war, casualties that the public sees as being 
suffered indefinitely, for no clear, good, or achievable purposes” undermine public 
support.52  So, the deployment of the relatively small HUNSOF might jeopardize a much 
bigger contribution in Afghanistan: the Hungarian Provincial Reconstruction Team of 
about 300 personnel, and Hungary’s whole peacekeeping presence of some 1,000 
personnel around the world. 
Furthermore, the political and military leadership currently lack both the 
knowledge and the experience to employ its new HUNSOF.  The HUNSOF does not yet 
have a command and control element at the strategic level that could advise the political 
and military leadership on how to best employ the HUNSOF, given the force’s 
limitations.  Consequently, the political and military leadership have no clear picture of 
HUNSOF. 
Bearing in mind these considerations, the political leadership has imposed 
limitations on the deployment of the HUNSOF; it is not authorized to execute counter-
narcotics operations in Afghanistan.  The military leadership is concerned about the 
unpredictable reaction of the political leadership and the society in case of major losses in 
the ranks of the HUNSOF.  The death of two Hungarian explosives experts – another 
capability exposed to high risk – in Afghanistan in June and July 2008 has not reduced 
public support toward Hungary’s participation in ISAF.53  The question is, though, what 
will be the tipping point in terms of casualties, leading to a cessation of public support for 
the Hungarian forces’ employment in Afghanistan.  Therefore, the future strategic 
command and control element of the HUNSOF should maintain public support for the 
HUNSOF employment in Afghanistan and elsewhere. 
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The NATO SOF Study states SOF development requires a relatively minor 
expenditure of total defense costs: 
In comparison to other defence expenditures, such a SOF capability 
requires a comparatively minor expenditure of total defence costs, 
especially when compared to the potential return on investment.54 
The NATO SOF Study provides a useful reference point about how much investment is 
required to build a SOF capability: 
. . . an investment of approximately 13 million Euros [approximately USD 
18.9 million] could completely outfit a 110 man land oriented SOF 
company / squadron sized organization with equipment including 
vehicular mobility, communication, computers, weapons, night vision, 
surveillance optics, and various other specialty equipment.55 
In the case of the HDF, the available financial resources for developing the 
HUNSOF have been limited.  For instance, no funds have been allocated for the 
transformation of the long-range reconnaissance battalion into a special operations 
battalion, which is the core of the HUNSOF.  A significant step forward was made in 
2005, when Hungary found a strong partner, the United States, which provided its 
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) Program with funds to develop the HUNSOF.56  Since 
2006, the United States continued its support.  FMF allocates some USD 2 million per 
year for defense projects that Hungary has used to develop and improve SOF, deployable 
nuclear biological chemical/medical units, a high-readiness light infantry unit, engineer 
                                                 
54 NSCC, NATO SOF Study, iv. 
55 NSCC, NATO SOF Study, 31. 
56 “Foreign Military Financing, the U.S. government program for financing through grants or loans the 
acquisition of U.S. military articles, services, and training, supports U.S. regional stability goals and 
enables friends and allies to improve their defense capabilities.  …  FMF helps countries meet their 
legitimate defense needs, promotes U.S. national security interests by strengthening coalitions with friends 
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skills, and non-commissioned officer leadership in the last couple of years.57  Prior to 
this, FMF allocated some USD 98 million between 1996 and 2005 to develop, modernize, 
and improve various capabilities of the HDF.58 
The United States also donates equipment to enhance the development and 
technical modernization of the HDF, including the HUNSOF.  For instance, in August 
2008, the United States donated 27 M998 M1152 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled 
Vehicles (HMMWV, Humvees, Hummers) to Hungarian contingents operating in 
Afghanistan.59  The HUNSOF received four of these vehicles. 
Moreover, Hungary joined the NATO Special Operations Forces Transformation 
Initiative Concept through which participants can seek favorable financial arrangements 
when developing and procuring compatible equipment for NATO SOF.60  The future 
strategic command and control element of the HUNSOF should lobby for better financial 
support that would enhance the development of the HUNSOF. 
3. Force Proposal to NATO 
The development of the HUNSOF has to meet the HDF force proposal to NATO.  
The NATO SOF Study states the development of SOF requires years: 
No short cut exists to create SOF when crisis arise.  Instead, years of 
training, education, and expertise acquired through an investment in time 
and resources are necessary to prepare SOF units to successfully perform 
special operations.61 
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In 2005, the HDF assigned the HUNSOF for future NATO missions and 
undertook to have a fully operational SOF company by the end of 2010.62  This self-
imposed time constraint forced the HDF to act quickly in order to meet the force proposal 
to NATO.  This force proposal later was proved, however, to be too ambitious because 
the financial conditions were not favorable.  Consequently, the HDF had to modify its 
original force proposal and assigned less capable HUNSOF for NATO operations.63  The 
HDF prepares intense training schedules for the HUNSOF to meet the deadline of the 
force proposal to NATO.  The future strategic command and control element of the 
HUNSOF should advise the political and military leadership to avoid making other 
ambitious force proposals to NATO. 
4. Attrition of Operators 
Addressing attrition of Hungarian Special Forces (HUNSF) operators is vital, 
because it takes more time and resources to train and educate personnel in special 
operations units than in general purpose forces.  The HDF has to invest years of training 
and education into trainees so that they will be able to meet the high physical, mental, and 
medical standards for parachuting, diving, survival exercises and other military activities 
to which they will be exposed.  It is worthwhile to do this; therefore, it is important to 
place emphasis on the retention of the relatively expensive special operations personnel, 
especially operators, who are usually non-commissioned officers and officer corps. 
Problems arose in 2006, when large numbers of highly-trained SF operators with 
experience from Peace Support Operations started to quit the 34th ‘László Bercsényi’ 
Special Operations Battalion, primarily for more remunerative civilian jobs.  For 
instance, the attrition in 2007 was as high as 3 to 11 operators per month at the 400-man 
                                                 
62 Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Hungary, “The Republic of Hungary’s Force Proposal to 
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strong 34th ‘László Bercsényi’ Special Operations Battalion.64  To address the high 
attrition rate, the HDF developed retention procedures and practices.  The HDF launched 
a bonus program, gave special pay, and established more favorable retirement conditions 
for SF operators than for general purpose forces.  As a result of these retention 
procedures and practices, the attrition slowly decreased to 2–5 operators per month in 
2008, and 1–4 operators per month in 2009.65 
As seen, the HDF placed emphasis on pay to be competitive in the labor market.  
Nonetheless, it is still problematic to retain SF operators.  Therefore, the future strategic 
command and control element of the HUNSOF should develop a comprehensive 
retention policy. 
5. Expertise 
Developing and deploying the HUNSOF require expertise.  Since the HDF was 
lacking expertise at the early phase of the HUNSOF development process, the Hungarian 
political and military leadership requested the assistance of their NATO allies.  The 
United States has volunteered to mentor of the HUNSOF and the U.S. Army Security 
Assistance Training Management Organization (USSATMO) has sent Mobile Training 
Teams to execute the training of the HUNSF.66  In 2006, a U.S. Mobile Training Team 
assisted the first qualification course, and the 34th ‘László Bercsényi’ Special Operations 
Battalion reached the Initial Operational Capability.  Since that time, the training and 
development procedure has quickened. 
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To gain field experience, one company of the 34th ‘László Bercsényi’ Special 
Operations Battalion was transferred to NATO ISAF command in Afghanistan in 2004 
and 2008, while some elements were transferred to NATO Training Mission–Iraq (NTM–
I) command in Iraq in 2005.  In February 2009, one Hungarian Special Operations Task 
Unit was deployed to Afghanistan to be part of the 1st Battalion of the 10th Special Forces 
Group (hereinafter referred to as U.S. Task Force 1/10) for four months.  Upon finishing 
their tour, another Special Operations Task Unit replaced them; and this will continue 
until all deployable Hungarian Special Operations Task Units finish their four-month 
tours.67  HUNSOF deployment in Afghanistan is studied in Chapter V, while the 
effectiveness of the Hungarian Special Operations Task Units in Afghanistan is studied in 
Chapter VI. 
Additionally, SOF operators, non-commissioned officers, and staff officers were 
assigned to conduct SOF-related studies and training abroad in order to gain familiarity 
with tactical, operational, and strategic aspects of SOF.  For instance, in addition to their 
training and education conducted in Hungary, six non-commissioned officers from the 
34th ‘László Bercsényi’ Special Operations Battalion participated in Ranger, SOF, free 
fall parachuting, combat engineer, and combat radio operator courses and training in the 
United States in 2007.68  Also, four officers from different units, commands, and 
agencies of the Hungarian defense establishment started their studies of the strategic 
aspects of SOF at the Naval Postgraduate School in the United States in 2008. 
Thirteen contracted soldiers and non-commissioned officers from the 34th ‘László 
Bercsényi’ Special Operations Battalion attended combat medical, tactical satellite, 
combat radio operator, and advanced non-commissioned officer courses and trainings in 
Germany, Italy, Poland, and the United States in 2008.69  Thirty military personnel 
representing all ranks and files of the 34th ‘László Bercsényi’ Special Operations 
Battalion participated in intelligence, SOF planning, combat medical, combat radio 
                                                 
67 Author’s interview with Lieutenant Colonel Imre Porkoláb, Commander of the 34th ‘László 
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68 Author, E-mail Correspondence with the 34th ‘László Bercsényi’ Special Operations Battalion. 
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operator, winter mountain, staff officer, and tactical satellite courses and trainings in 
Belgium, Germany, Italy, Slovakia, and the United States in 2009.70  The future strategic 
command and control element of the HUNSOF should continue to have good relations 
with the mentor nation and the NSCC, and continue assigning HUNSOF personnel 
abroad for training and educational purposes in order to collect further knowledge and 
experience. 
This section studied the major challenges that the HDF faced during the 
development of its SOF.  This thesis provides recommendations on how to more 
efficiently address these challenges in Chapter VII.  The next section summarizes the 
findings of Chapter IV. 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The Hungarian political leadership endorsed the development of the HUNSOF 
because these forces can enhance national security, contribute to the collective security of 
NATO and the EU, and fill shortfalls in Peace Support Operations led by these two 
international organizations.  The HUNSOF; however, is not a national tool to counter 
terrorism. 
While developing and employing its SOF, the HDF has to manage five major 
challenges.  Losses in the ranks of the relatively small HUNSOF deployed in Afghanistan 
might decrease public support for the entire Hungarian military presence in Afghanistan, 
and for Hungarian soldiers operating abroad in general.  The HDF employs information 
campaigns to maintain public support for the HUNSOF employment in Afghanistan and 
elsewhere. 
The HDF has limited financial resources to develop and deploy its SOF.  The 
HDF uses the Unites States Foreign Military Financing Program to finance HUNSOF, 
and U.S. donations and the NATO Special Operations Forces Transformation Initiative 
Concept to enhance the development and technical modernization of its SOF. 
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The HDF made an ambitious force proposal to NATO:  To assign the HUNSOF 
to future NATO missions, and to have a fully operational SOF company by the end of 
2010.  The HDF must develop its SOF rapidly to meet this force proposal to NATO. 
Because the attrition of HUNSF operators leaving for more profitable civilian 
jobs is a concern, the HDF developed retention procedures and practices to be 
competitive in the labor market, and retain SF operators. 
The HDF lacked expertise to develop its SOF.  The HDF requested the 
mentorship of U.S. Mobile Training Teams to execute the training of the HUNSF, 
assigned operators, non-commissioned officers, and staff officers to conduct SOF-related 
studies and training abroad, and deployed its SOF elements to NATO operations to gain 
field experience.  The future strategic command and control element of the HUNSOF 
should advise the military leadership about how to more efficiently manage inter alia 
these challenges.  The next chapter studies the employment of the HUNSOF in 
Afghanistan in 2009. 
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V. THE HUNGARIAN SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES IN 
AFGHANISTAN IN 2009 
The Republic of Hungary has contributed military forces to the international 
community’s military efforts in Afghanistan since 2003.  The HUNSOF deployment in 
Afghanistan is an organic part of its development:  It is its testing stage.  The first 
Hungarian Special Operations Task Unit (HUN SOTU) of the 34th ‘László Bercsényi’ 
Special Operations Battalion, reinforced with other elements, operated in Afghanistan 
between February and June 2009, while the second rotation was deployed between June 
and October 2009.  The deployed HUNSOF in Afghanistan is under NATO-led ISAF 
command and part of U.S. Task Force 1/10.  The United States has played the role of 
framework nation for the HUNSOF. 
This chapter studies ISAF, ISAF SOF, and the HUNSOF’s first two rotations in 
Afghanistan between February and October 2009.  The first section reviews the strength 
and mission, command and control, structure, and challenges of ISAF; and mission, 
tasks, and structure of ISAF SOF.  The second section reviews the mission, task, 
structure, command and control, national caveat, and mandate of the deployed HUNSOF 
in Afghanistan, as well as the challenges the HUNSOF faces in Afghanistan.  The third 
section summarizes the findings of Chapter V. 
A. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE IN 
AFGHANISTAN 
1. Strength and Mission 
Former NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer stated that Afghanistan 
was “NATO’s most important operational priority,” while U.S. President Barack Obama 
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called Afghanistan “the most important mission to NATO.”71  Yet in their article, 
Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason call Afghanistan “today’s Vietnam.”72  In 
December 2001, NATO launched its International Security Assistance Force with the 
task of securing the capital of Kabul, based on a UN mandate.  ISAF gradually expanded 
the mission to include the whole country starting in October 2003.  Today, ISAF is a 
multinational operation of some 67,700 personnel, deployed by forty-two Troop 
Contributing Nations.73  ISAF’s mission is to assist the Afghan government and 
authorities in providing security and stability, and to create the conditions for 
reconstruction and development. 
2. Command and Control 
ISAF is commanded by a classic three-level command and control structure.  At 
the strategic level, NATO Allied Command Operations (ACO) in Mons, Belgium is 
responsible for all Alliance operations; therefore, it also assumes the overall command of 
the ISAF.  At the operational level, Allied Joint Force Command Headquarters Brunssum 
(JFC HQ B) in the Netherlands exercises the operational command.  In other words, JFC 
HQ B is the Operational Headquarters (OHQ) of ISAF.  At the tactical level, 
Headquarters ISAF (HQ ISAF) in Kabul, Afghanistan, serves as the operational theatre 
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level command for the mission.  Therefore, HQ ISAF is the Force Headquarters (FHQ) of 
ISAF.  The force commander is a four-star general who is also the Commander of ISAF 
and U.S. Forces in Afghanistan, and, therefore, coordinates both ISAF operations and the 
U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom. 
3. Structure 
Five Regional Commands under HQ ISAF coordinate activities of the Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in their respective areas of responsibility.  Twenty-six 
PRTs operate in Afghanistan: there are five PRTs under the German-led Regional 
Command North in Mazar-e-Sharif, four PRTs under the Italian-led Regional Command 
West in Herat, four PRTs under the Dutch-led Regional Command South in Kandahar 
(Canada, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom rotate as the lead-nation), 13 PRTs 
under the U.S.-led Regional Command East in Bagram, and there are no PRTs in the 
French-led Regional Command Capital in the capital of Kabul.  Figure 3 indicates the 
location of ISAF Regional Commands and Provincial Reconstruction Teams.74 
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Figure 3. Location of ISAF Regional Commands and Provincial Reconstruction 
Teams (After Reference listed in Footnote no. 74.) 
4. Challenges 
First and foremost, the ISAF has to fight, as David Kilcullen characterizes in The 
Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One, a “hybrid war” of 
counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, counter-narcotics, and tribal warfare.75  In his 
assessment, U.S. General Stanley A. McChrystal, Commander of ISAF and U.S. Forces 
in Afghanistan, declared that ISAF’s eight-year campaign to win the “hybrid war” was 
not going well, stating that, “The situation in Afghanistan is serious,” but, “Success is 
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achievable.”76  To achieve success, General McChrystal called for an urgent change in 
military strategy from “hunt, kill or capture” to “clear, hold, and build,” and the approval 
of as many as 40,000 additional troops needed to retake the initiative from the resurgent 
Taliban.  U.S. President Obama has recently sent a surge of 21,000 troops to Afghanistan, 
bringing the total to 68,000 U.S. Forces stationed in Afghanistan altogether.  If approved, 
the question is whether a new strategy (quality) and another major troop increase 
(quantity) could contribute to success. 
A second challenge resides in the fact that the ISAF has to confront problems of 
legitimacy.  In order to succeed, the ISAF counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency 
campaign requires a legitimate Afghan government.  The fraudulent 2009 presidential 
election in Afghanistan, however, cast doubt on the legitimacy of President Hamid 
Karzai’s administration in the eyes of Afghan people, the Taliban “shadow government,” 
and the International Community.  If there is no legitimate governance in Afghanistan, 
the ISAF might appear as an occupying force – an awful situation for the ISAF, but a 
greatly exploitable opportunity for the Taliban.  The question is how the currently weak 
Afghan state can handle this legitimacy crisis. 
A third challenge is that the ISAF is not mandated to deal with the complex 
Afghanistan/Pakistan problem.  Even though the Pakistani regime took military actions 
against the Taliban, al Qaeda, and affiliated extremists in, for instance, the Swat Valley, 
the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, especially Waziristan, have remained an 
insurgent stronghold.  There are Wazir tribes in Pakistan loyal to the Taliban and with 
strong ties to tribes in Afghanistan.  Insurgent Wazir-Taliban forces repeatedly launch 
operations from Pakistan through the porous Afghan-Pakistani border inside Afghanistan, 
and then return.  Since the ISAF is mandated to carry out operations within the 
boundaries of Afghanistan, dealing with the Taliban and its Wazir associates in Pakistan 
rests on Pakistani Security Forces.  After its offensives in 2003 and 2004, Pakistan made 
a cease-fire agreement with the Taliban.  In autumn 2009, Pakistani Security Forces, with 
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U.S. assistance, launched another offensive against the Taliban in Waziristan.  The 
question is whether Pakistan is willing and capable of grappling with the Taliban, al 
Qaeda, and affiliated extremists at this time. 
A fourth challenge is seen in that the ISAF has to synchronize its efforts with 
other international missions.  The EU, the UN, and the World Bank, in addition to 
NATO, have launched missions and projects in Afghanistan.  It is, therefore, vital that 
efforts of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, the EU Police Mission in 
Afghanistan, and the World Bank projects be synchronized.  Key players expect the UN 
to step up as a coordinator.  The question is whether the UN is able to deal with this 
complex objective. 
A fifth challenge is that ISAF has to face force withdrawals before meeting 
political and military objectives.  Continuous public support is vital for the future of the 
deployed HUNSOF, ISAF SOF, ISAF as a whole, and military engagements in general.  
Different reasons and beliefs might lead to decreasing public support toward participating 
in Peace Support Operations, or continuing military campaigns. 
The Spanish public ceased supporting its government’s Iraqi foreign policy 
because the U.S.-led Coalition of the Willing was lacking a UN mandate and, “Many 
believe the 11 March train bomb attacks were a result of the former government’s support 
of the US policy.”77  Yielding under public pressure, the freshly elected Spanish 
government pulled out its 1,300-man contingent from the Coalition of the Willing in 
2004.  The Spanish force withdrawal then caused other nations to leave the coalition too.  
Since Spain commanded a multinational brigade that included 302 troops from the 
Dominican Republic, 368 troops from Honduras, and 230 troops from Nicaragua, these  
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latter three have also withdrawn their contingents from Iraq.78  Decreasing public support 
in Spain resulted in the withdrawal from the Coalition of the Willing of altogether 2,200 
military personnel from four countries. 
Another reason for force withdrawal could be casualty aversion.  In the case of an 
ISAF Troop Contributing Nation, which – similar to Hungary – has an important, but not 
vital, national interest in participating in ISAF with SOF and general purpose forces that 
subsequently suffer heavy casualties, the political leadership might decide to withdraw its 
forces partially or completely from Afghanistan. 
Declining public support in an ISAF Troop Contributing Nation might generate 
similar to or greater international force withdrawal from Afghanistan than the Spanish 
withdrawal from Iraq.  Force withdrawals would have a negative effect on ISAF counter-
insurgency capabilities.  Reducing the number of ISAF SOF would raise the burden 
placed on the less capable Afghan counter-insurgency forces, which, in turn, could 
jeopardize mission success. 
U.S. Marines, for example, left the Nicaraguan Guardia National and the allied 
Miskito tribes alone in the Rio Coco area to deal with the Sandinista guerrillas in 1931.79  
Lacking U.S. assistance, the Guardia National was soon defeated by the Sandinistas. 
The scenario was similar when U.S. Forces were withdrawn from Vietnam, 
leaving their South Vietnamese allies alone in early 1973.  Consequently, the North 
Vietnamese communist insurgents defeated the orphaned South Vietnamese Forces by 
June 1975. 
Eight years of fighting in remote Afghanistan that have resulted in casualties to 
American, Asian, and European Troop Contributing Nations might lead to reduced public 
support for ISAF.  As happened with Spain, some nations, yielding under public pressure, 
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might withdraw their SOF and/or general purpose forces from Afghanistan.  One leaving 
nation then might induce others also to withdraw.  As a consequence of multitudinous 
international force withdrawal, Afghan Security Forces might easily fall to Taliban 
insurgents, and the return of the Taliban to power might also mean the return of al Qaeda 
and affiliated extremists.  This scenario would be a complete mission failure for NATO 
and the whole international community. 
To avoid mission failure, Troop Contributing Nations have to generate public 
support for ISAF.  In practice, however, some ISAF Troop Contributing Nations have 
already started making announcements about their planned withdrawals: 
Canada has reaffirmed its intention to withdraw 2,500 soldiers in 2011. 
Holland is set to follow suit. And the German and Italian governments 
find it increasingly difficult to justify their troop contributions.80 
This discussion has demonstrated the public’s potential to influence military 
engagements including ISAF, and the importance of strategic patience.  The question is, 
what is the tipping point of the public within Troop Contributing Nations. 
5. Mission, Tasks, and Structure of ISAF Special Operations Forces 
Historically, SOF implements irregular warfare.  Both Kilcullen and General 
McChrystal have recommended shifting from an enemy-centric conventional warfare 
approach to a population-centric irregular form of warfare; therefore, it is worthwhile to 
study SOF inside ISAF. 
The mission of ISAF SOF is to support indigenous conventional forces in 
countering an insurgency.  To achieve this mission ISAF SOF carries out both direct and 
indirect tasks.  In his article, Admiral Eric T. Olson, Commander of U.S. Special 
Operations Command, profoundly captures the essence of direct and indirect tasks or 
approaches by using the “killing alligators and draining the swamp” analogy: 
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The direct approach consists of those efforts that disrupt violent extremist 
organizations - the polite way of saying capturing, killing, and interdicting 
terrorists and terrorist networks to prevent them from harming us in the 
near term.  It also denies access to and use of weapons of mass destruction 
by violent extremist organizations, many of which have declared their 
specific intent to acquire and use such weapons to kill great numbers of 
people in the U.S. and elsewhere.  These operations are conducted largely 
by the military.  The direct approach is urgent, necessary, chaotic and 
kinetic, and the effects are mostly short term. 
But they are not decisive.  Enduring results come from the indirect 
approaches - those in which we enable partners to combat violent 
extremist organizations themselves by contributing to their capabilities 
through training, equipment, transfer of technology, wargaming [sic], and 
so forth.  It consists of efforts to deter tacit and active support for violent 
extremist organizations where the government is either unwilling or 
unable to remove terrorist sanctuaries.  It is the efforts to shape and 
stabilize the environment that impact the enemy in the longterm [sic].  
This is truly “draining the swamp,” rather than simply attempting to 
capture or kill all of the “alligators.”81 
Direct task/approach/action is also called black or kinetic mission, while indirect 
task/approach/action is called white or non-kinetic mission. 
ISAF has nine Special Operations Task Forces (SOTFs) that carry out direct and 
indirect actions all over Afghanistan.  An SOTF is comprised of Special Operations Task 
Groups (SOTGs).  A Special Operations Task Group is made up of Special Operations 
Task Units (SOTUs).  “A Special Operations Task Unit is the lowest level of a SOF 
tactical-level combat element [and] . . . is normally comprised of 4-16 personnel.”82  A 
Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE) coordinates, deconflicts, 
and synchronizes special operations with conventional forces.  As of October 2009, 
Australia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Sweden, the United  
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Kingdom, and the United States are contributing special operations forces to ISAF.  Also, 
U.S. SOF operates under Operation Enduring Freedom’s chain-of-command. 
This section studied ISAF and ISAF SOF.  The next section studies the deployed 
HUNSOF in Afghanistan. 
B. THE HUNGARIAN SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES IN 
AFGHANISTAN 
1. Mission, Task, and Structure 
The mission of the HUNSOF is to support indigenous conventional forces in 
countering insurgency in the Wardak province of Afghanistan, situated in the U.S.-led 
Regional Command East.  To achieve the mission, the HUNSOF carries out direct and 
indirect tasks equally.83  The deployed HUNSOF consists of one SOTU and two staff 
officers.  The HUN SOTU was reinforced with a National Intelligence Support Team and 
a language assistant, and was inserted into the U.S. SOTF.  The United States serves as a 
framework nation for the HUNSOF.  One staff officer serves at the SOCCE in Kabul; he 
is the liaison officer to the Afghan National Security Forces.  The other staff officer 
serves at the SOTG; he is also the red card holder who has the authority to give the 
executive order to the HUN SOTU. 
2. Command and Control, National Caveat, and Mandate 
The deployed HUNSOF in Afghanistan remains under full Hungarian national 
Operational Command (OPCOM).  Operational control (OPCON) is exercised by the 
Commander of the SOCCE, while tactical control (TACON) is exercised by the 
Commander of the U.S. SOTG in which the HUNSOF is inserted. 
The HUNSOF is authorized to carry out operations, except for counter-narcotics, 
within the boundaries of Afghanistan.  The Hungarian Parliament has endorsed the 
government’s recommendation to extend the mandate of the HUNSOF until October 
2010. 
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The deployed HUNSOF in Afghanistan lacks materials and operation funds, staff 
officers and language assistants, and experience, and has to maintain a high operational 
tempo. 
The HUNSOF lacks some medical and telecommunications materials.  Also, the 
allocated amount of operations funds for the HUNSOF is considered to be less than 
operational flexibility would require.  The lack of Pashtun-Hungarian language assistants 
and staff officers who meet all operational requirements assigned to headquarters staff 
positions is a concern.  Since the HUNSOF does not have operational experience in 
carrying out special operations, especially in countering insurgency, it relies on the 
mentoring of U.S. SOF experts.  HUN SOTUs have a short tour of four months in which 
to demonstrate their capabilities, produce results, and improve skills; therefore, they have 
to maintain a high operational tempo.  The future strategic command and control element 
of the HUNSOF should lobby for better conditions that could enhance the deployment of 
the HUNSOF in Afghanistan. 
This section briefly portrayed the deployed HUNSOF in Afghanistan in 2009, 
while Chapter VI provides a more focused analysis on the effectiveness of these forces.  
The next section summarizes the findings of Chapter V. 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The international community faces great challenges in Afghanistan, and ISAF is 
not performing well.  Politicians and military strategists are still discussing what would 
be the best mission, strength, mandate, and cooperation among military components in 
their efforts to defeat the hybrid war in Afghanistan.  Strategic patience in Troop 
Contributing Nations is indispensable to continue and improve ISAF.  Nevertheless, there 





Nine nations contribute with SOFs to ISAF.  ISAF SOFs carry out direct and 
indirect actions in order to support Afghan conventional forces in countering insurgency.  
By operating in Wardak province of Afghanistan since February 2009, the HUNSOF 
contributes to achieving the ISAF SOF mission. 
This chapter studies the first two HUNSOF rotations, while the third and future 
rotations invite analysis from Hungarian subject matter experts.  The next chapter 
assesses the effectiveness of SOF. 
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VI. ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SPECIAL 
OPERATIONS FORCES 
Effectiveness measures the degree to which a system attains its goals.  The 
contemporary discipline of Organizational Design conceptualizes effectiveness in terms 
of system resources or input goals, internal process goals, output goals, and 
stakeholders.84  It is the stakeholder approach among these four perspectives that mostly 
focuses on human nature.  The stakeholder approach puts the actors, their behavior, 
interaction, purposes, deliberations, decisions, intentions, motives, values, and norms at 
the center of its scientific inquiry; therefore, it best fits this thesis. 
Richard L. Daft claims in Essentials of Organization Theory and Design that 
“[t]he strength of the stakeholder approach is that it takes a broad view of effectiveness 
and examines factors in the environment as well as within the organization” and 
underlining this approach “acknowledges that there is no single measure of 
effectiveness.”85 
This chapter focuses on the effectiveness of SOF.   The first section introduces a 
Collaborative Assessment Guide.  The second section assesses the effectiveness of the 
HUNSOF in Afghanistan with a Collaborative Assessment Guide.  The third section 
summarizes the findings of Chapter VI. 
A. COLLABORATIVE ASSESSMENT GUIDE 
The NATO SOF Study states that SOF has to be optimized in order to mitigate risk 
of failure and provide a high probability of success: 
Although the entire military and security establishment seeks to continue 
to evolve and enhance its capabilities to confront the dynamic threat 
among the ambiguous environment, SOF in particular needs to be  
 
                                                 
84 David P. Hannah, Designing Organizations for High Performance (New York: Addison-Wesley 
Publishing Company, 1988). 
85 Richard L. Daft, Essentials of Organization Theory and Design (International Edition Publisher: 
South-Western College Pub, 2001), 28. 
60 
 
optimized or made as perfect, functional, and effective as possible to 
ensure they can succeed when called to perform missions and tasks 
beyond the standard capabilities of conventional forces.86 
Even though there are useful – mostly quantitative – writings that provide models 
for measuring effectiveness, the contemporary discussion about measuring combat 
effectiveness does not result in a universally accepted model. 
Trevor N. Dupuy uses the Operational Lethality Index and the Result Index to 
measure the effectiveness of the German and Allied Forces in World War II.87  He states 
that German divisions were better organized and prepared for combat, and this led to a 
more effective ground combat capability over Allies’ Forces.88 
In his classic Operations Research Model, Brian McCue studies inter alia the Bay 
transit and the U-boat circulation models to measure the effectiveness of submarine and 
anti-submarine warfare during World War II.89 
By measuring morale, logistics, leadership, intelligence, initiative, and technology 
of defense forces on a 9-point scale, Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam III provide evidence 
for the phenomenon that democracies tend to be more superior in battlefield effectiveness 
and, therefore, win more wars.90 
Glenn A. Kent uses the SABER GRAND Model to assess the effectiveness of 
bomber attacks and anti-ballistic missiles deployment.91  And Scott S. Gartner criticizes 
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the quantitative indicators of counting insurgent Viet Cong bodies and captured weapons 
to assess U.S. performance during the Vietnam War.92 
There is a growing literature that aims at measuring the effectiveness of land, air, 
and maritime warfare, but there exists no widely accepted method that can be used to 
assess NATO’s performance in Afghanistan, the Balkans, Iraq, and elsewhere. 
There is a similar discussion without result about the question of what makes SOF 
successful.  William H. McRaven believes that relative superiority, which can be 
achieved by simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed, and purpose, is the key for 
SOF success.93 
Robert G. Spulak Jr. states flexibility, creativity, and a high degree of training 
help SOFs to overcome the friction of war at a lower level of risk than that experienced 
by general purpose forces.94 
Richard B. Andres, Craig Wills, and Thomas E. Griffith Jr. claim that SOF’s 
ability to cooperate by, through, and with indigenous forces makes SOF successful.95  
Additionally, the NATO SOF Study emphasizes that successful execution of special 
operations requires a high level of collaboration among various elements, and the 
importance of “formalized multilateral NATO SOF partnership” because “Ad hoc 
random partnership cannot build the level of mutual trust and confidence needed for 
better interoperability on the battlefield.”96 
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Porkoláb and Bári advocate that successful special operations depend on clear 
national and theater strategic objectives; effective command, control, communications, 
computer, and intelligence support; and a force trained, equipped, and organized 
specifically to conduct special operations.97 
Ultimately, there is no consensus on what makes a successful SOF.  This thesis 
contributes to the ongoing discussion about what characteristics make SOF successful by 
providing a Collaborative Assessment Guide for further consideration. 
The Collaborative Assessment Guide is a set of guiding criteria designed to assess 
SOF effectiveness in multinational operations and campaigns.  This Collaborative 
Assessment Guide combines and improves the views of Daft, Andres, Wills, and Griffith, 
and the NATO SOF Study. 
Daft claims a stakeholder approach is adequate to analyze effectiveness within the 
environment and the organization.98  Andres, Wills, and Griffith state SOFs are 
successful when they cooperate by, through, and with indigenous forces while the NATO 
SOF Study advocates SOF collaboration with allied and partner SOFs and general 
purpose forces for effective interoperability on the battlefield.99 
In line with Daft’s stakeholder approach, as well as Andres, Wills, and Griffith’s 
underlying SOF skills and NATO SOF Study’s reference point, the Collaborative 
Assessment Guide claims effective SOFs depend on their ability to collaborate with 
allied/partner SOFs, national and allied/partner conventional forces, and indigenous 
forces and population.  Therefore, SOF effectiveness should be measured by these 
abilities. 
This thesis, thus, establishes the following criteria for assessing SOF effectiveness 
while operating in multinational operations and campaigns: 
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 Ability to collaborate with allied/partner SOF during pre-deployment and 
employment periods; 
 Ability to collaborate with national conventional forces during pre-
employment and employment periods; 
 Ability to collaborate with allied/partner conventional forces during pre-
employment and employment periods; 
 Ability to collaborate with indigenous forces and population during 
employment period. 
The assessment of SOF effectiveness while carrying out special operations unilaterally 
requires a different set of criteria. 
The Collaborative Assessment Guide assesses SOF ability to collaborate with 
allied/partner SOF during pre-deployment and employment periods; with national 
conventional forces during pre-employment and employment periods; with allied/ partner 
conventional forces during pre-employment and employment periods; and with 
indigenous forces and population during employment periods.  The Collaborative 
Assessment Guide determines whether or not SOF collaboration with these stakeholders 
is sufficient.  SOF collaboration is sufficient when these forces have stable working 
relationships with the above-mentioned stakeholders. 
The establishment of a more detailed method to measure SOF effectiveness 
invites analysis by subject matter experts.  The next section assesses the effectiveness of 
the HUNSOF in Afghanistan with the Collaborative Assessment Guide. 
B. ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE HUNGARIAN SPECIAL 
OPERATIONS FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN WITH COLLABORATIVE 
ASSESSMENT GUIDE 
Applying criteria of the Collaborative Assessment Guide to the HUNSOF in 
Afghanistan, mission success relies on the HUNSOF ability to establish a sufficient level 
of collaboration with the U.S. SOF during the pre-deployment period and in Afghanistan; 
with Hungarian conventional forces during the pre-employment period and in 
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Afghanistan; with allied conventional forces during the pre-employment period and in 
Afghanistan, and with the Afghan population and Security Forces.  The HUNSOF is a 
developing capability, and its employment to ISAF is its first employment as SOF; 
therefore, the HUNSOF has neither traditional partners nor experience in collaboration.  
Nonetheless, the HUNSOF has managed to establish a sufficient level of collaboration 
with all relevant Afghan, Hungarian, and international stakeholders.  Also, the English 
language is crucial for the HUNSOF when working with international stakeholders. 
1. HUNSOF Collaboration With U.S. SOF During Pre-Employment 
Period 
The HUNSOF has established a sufficient level of collaboration with U.S. SOF 
during the pre-employment period.  Since 2006, Mobile Training Teams consisting of 
U.S. instructors have mentored the development of the HUNSOF.  In the course of the 
last few years, the HUNSOF has become familiar with the U.S. SOF doctrine, planning, 
training requirements and methods, tactics, techniques and procedures, small arms and 
light weapons, and, the English language.  The HUNSOF also participated in the NATO 
SOF exercise “Jackal Stone” in 2008 and 2009, along with the U.S. Task Force 1/10.  
These exercises provided the opportunity for both elements to study each other’s 
equipment and share operational tactics, techniques and procedures. 
During its second rotation, the HUNSOF conducted pre-employment training with 
its counterparts from the U.S. Task Force 1/10 in Germany.  International SOF courses 
and seminars facilitated by the 34th ‘László Bercsényi’ Special Operations Battalion and 
the Peace Support Training Centre helped to establish a common understanding about SF 
and SOF, and to advance regional cooperation.  Moreover, SOF operators, non-
commissioned officers, and staff officers were assigned to conduct SOF-related studies 
and training in the United States.  Upon returning, their gained knowledge has also 




2. HUNSOF Collaboration With U.S. SOF in Afghanistan 
The HUNSOF has established a sufficient level of collaboration with U.S. SOF in 
Afghanistan.  The United States serves as a framework nation for the HUNSOF, and the 
working language in this effort is English.  Even though the Technical Agreement 
between Hungarian and U.S. Forces in Afghanistan is not completed yet, U.S. Task Force 
1/10 provided combat support and combat service support to the HUNSOF.  
Additionally, because there was no Hungarian national support element deployed to the 
HUNSOF, assigned operators had to deal with logistics, sacrificing valuable operational 
time.  In practice, the collaboration between the HUNSOF and U.S. Task Force 1/10 took 
place in a shared camp and in the common area of operation of the Wardak province.  
The HUNSOF and U.S. Task Force 1/10 planned and executed direct actions, and trained 
the assigned unit of the Afghan National Police together.  Accessing and sharing sensitive 
and confidential information was challenging because of the lack of technological 
background and strategic agreements.  In sum, existing difficulties disturb, but do not 
endanger, the collaboration between the HUNSOF and U.S. Task Force 1/10. 
3. HUNSOF Collaboration With Hungarian Conventional Forces 
During Pre-Employment Period 
The HUNSOF has established a sufficient level of collaboration with Hungarian 
conventional forces during the pre-employment period.  National and international 
exercises and training provide opportunities to strengthen the cooperation between the 
elements of the HUNSOF capability package, and to establish face-to-face relations.  In 
this context, the primary working language is Hungarian and the secondary is English. 
Since 2005, Exercise Direction of Action is the most important and largest annual 
training event of the HDF, designed to combine traditional and newly developed 
capabilities such as the HUNSOF, and present them to the political leadership and the 
public.100  The annual NATO SOF exercise “Jackal Stone” is another occasion where the 
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HUNSOF capability package can practice combined and joint cooperation in a 
multinational environment.  The pre-deployment training for all assigned military, police, 
and civilian personnel to Afghanistan is held at the Peace Support Training Centre.  
Nonetheless, much work remains with regard to deepening the collaboration between 
various elements of the HUNSOF, especially between special forces and special 
operations capable forces. 
4. HUNSOF Collaboration With Hungarian Conventional Forces in 
Afghanistan 
The HUNSOF has established a sufficient level of collaboration with Hungarian 
conventional forces in Afghanistan.  There are two major Hungarian force structures with 
conventional forces in Afghanistan at the moment: the Hungarian Provincial 
Reconstruction Team and the Hungarian-U.S. Operational Liaison and Mentoring Team. 
Hungary took over responsibility from the Netherlands for the Provincial 
Reconstruction Team operating in the Baghlan province of Afghanistan in October 2006.  
The Hungarian Provincial Reconstruction Team (HUN PRT) is located in and directly 
subordinate to the German-led ISAF Regional Command North.  The mission of the 
HUN PRT is to assist, support and mentor the Government of Afghanistan and the 
Afghan National Security Forces; to cooperate with local and international actors in the 
reconstruction and development of Afghanistan; to maintain a safe and secure 
environment in the Baghlan province; and to demonstrate an ISAF presence.  Camp 
Pannonia in the provincial capital of Pol-e Khomri is the base of the HUN PRT. 
Reconstruction done by the HUN PRT is a joint effort of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Education and 
Culture, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, the Ministry of Health, and 
the Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement of the Republic of Hungary.  The Special 
Committee of the Government on PRT Affairs oversees the performance of the HUN 
PRT. Some 310 military personnel and a handful of police officers, civilian 
representatives, and assigned project managers from the above-listed ministries work for 
67 
 
mission success.  Also, Bulgaria, Croatia, and Slovakia have delegated staff officers to 
the HUN PRT.101  Consequently, the primary working language is English. 
The HUN PRT has a budget of HUF 500 million (approximately USD 2.7 
million) of which HUF 200 million (approximately USD 1.8 million) is allocated for 
reconstruction projects.  The following countries have also contributed to reconstruction 
projects carried out by the HUN PRT:  Japan (approximately USD 170,000, in 2008), 
Greece (300,000 Euros, approximately USD 435,000, in 2009; and 500,000 Euros, 
approximately USD 725,000, in 2008), and Qatar. 
The Hungarian Parliament has endorsed the government’s recommendation to 
extend the mandate of the HUN PRT until October 2010.  Thanks to the relatively small 
geographical distance between the Wardak and Baghlan provinces, the HUN PRT is able 
to provide logistical support to the HUNSOF through ground lines of communication.  
Equally important is the information flown between the HUNSOF and the HUN PRT’s 
National Intelligence Support Element. 
The Hungarian-U.S. Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (HUN-U.S. 
OMLT) started its training activity in the Baghlan province of Afghanistan in April 2009.  
The HUN-U.S. OMLT is directly subordinate to the German-led ISAF Regional 
Command North.  The mission of the HUN-U.S. OMLT is to mentor and train the 700-
man strong 3rd (infantry) Battalion of the 2nd Brigade of the 209th Corps of the Afghan 
National Army until Afghan Forces have the capability to take over tasks and duties 
currently carried out by ISAF.  The base of the HUN-U.S. OMLT is Khelagay Base, 
which is about 20 km from Camp Pannonia, the HUN PRT’s base. 
The 60-man strong HUN-U.S. OMLT consists of roughly the same number of 
Hungarian personnel assigned from different units and U.S. troops from the Ohio 
National Guard.  The primary working language is English, but the HUN-U.S. OMLT 
also employs Pashtun language assistants for communicating with Afghan Forces.  The 
Hungarian Parliament has endorsed the government’s recommendation to extend the 
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Hungarian participation in the HUN-U.S. OMLT through August 2010.  Similarly, the 
HUNSOF in Wardak province shares information with, and receives some logistical 
support from, the HUN-U.S. OMLT in the nearby Baghlan province. 
5. HUNSOF Collaboration With Allied Conventional Forces During 
Pre-Employment Period 
The HUNSOF has established a sufficient level of collaboration with allied 
conventional forces during the pre-employment period.  Units that comprise the 
HUNSOF capability package have all participated in multinational training, exercises, 
and more importantly, Peace Support Operations in the Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan, and 
elsewhere.  Individual and unit-level experience from these missions contributes to the 
growing knowledge and experience of the HUNSOF.  Some of the units that comprise the 
HUNSOF capability package have bilateral relationships akin to blood and family with 
units of NATO member counties.  For instance, the HDF 34th ‘László Bercsényi’ Special 
Operations Battalion has developed a longstanding and fruitful cooperation with the 
French 1st Parachute Hussar Regiment that was established by Count Bercsényi.  Visits, 
exchanges, and trainings are frequent between the two “Bercsényi units.”  The working 
language is English while collaborating with allied conventional forces. 
6. HUNSOF Collaboration With Allied Conventional Forces in 
Afghanistan 
The HUNSOF has established a sufficient level of collaboration with allied 
conventional forces in Afghanistan.  The HUNSOF has established a working 
relationship with the Turkish-led PRT, the French-led OMLT, and U.S. conventional 
forces in the Wardak province.  The working language is English when cooperating with 
allied conventional forces in Afghanistan. 
Close cooperation and information sharing with these partners is vital to obtaining 
a high level of situation awareness and force protection, and to earning actionable 
intelligence.  Gordon H. McCormick advocates that one of the greatest challenges of any 
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counter-insurgency is finding ways to target the insurgents.102  To be able to target 
insurgents, counter-insurgency forces have to earn the trust of the population.  If the 
population is collaborative, targeting can be effective and counter-insurgency forces can 
defeat the insurgency.  If the population does not collaborate with the counter-insurgency 
forces, the insurgents remain invisible, gain strength, and finally win their fight.  The 
central question of any population-centric irregular warfare is how to convince the 
population to collaborate with, and in support of, the counter-insurgency forces rather 
than the insurgents. 
It is worthwhile to mention U.S. Colonel Ralph O. Baker’s experience from Iraq 
in explaining how counter-insurgency forces should earn the people’s support.103  To 
earn their support, Baker’s brigade first sought to meet the Iraqis’ expectations of 
security, food, shelter, electricity, jobs, and medical care.  To demonstrate credibility, the 
brigade accomplished visible actions to improve the Baghdadis’ emotional well-being 
and quality of life. 
Thereafter, the brigade Information Operations structure repetitively 
communicated tangible results such as renovation, reconstruction, and development 
projects at every possible forum.  In contrast, the Information Operations machinery 
reiterated how much damage the insurgents caused with their attacks.  Instead of a full-
scale, direct Information Operations campaign that held out little hope, Baker’s brigade 
used local proxies to effectively reach out to the population.  The Information Operations 
structure identified target audiences, especially respected community members such as 
religious and tribal leaders, governmental officials, and university and school leaders, and 
frequently engaged them. 
Face-to-face interactions with target audiences gradually destroyed the walls of 
distrust.  These meetings also provided the opportunity to deliver precisely tailored 
messages and highlight economic, political, security, and social results.  After proving the 
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coalition forces’ credibility, target audiences started to forward the coalition’s messages 
to the Iraqi public.  The brigade has been able to demonstrably influence the perceptions 
of the Iraqis in favor of the coalition.  As a result, locals have collaborated with the 
brigade more intensively and provided, with increasing magnitude, actionable 
intelligence against the insurgents. 
This thesis asserts that Baker’s methods from Iraq are applicable to ISAF counter-
insurgency efforts in Afghanistan.  The PRTs represent Baker’s brigade in the struggle 
for earning the support and trust of the population in Afghanistan.  If the Turkish-led PRT 
could earn the support and trust of Afghanis in the Wardak province, the Turkish PRT 
might be a valuable and reliable source of information and actionable intelligence about 
insurgents.  For this reason, the HUNSOF is trying to collaborate with the Turkish-led 
PRT as closely as possible. 
7. HUNSOF Collaboration With the Afghan Population and Security 
Forces 
The HUNSOF has established a sufficient level of collaboration with the Afghan 
population and Security Forces. The primary working language is Pashtun; the 
secondary, English.  The limited number of available Pashtun-Hungarian language 
assistants fundamentally limits the HUNSOF’s capability to communicate with the 
Afghan population and Security Forces.  The HUNSOF employs a stakeholder analysis 
that enables it to acquire a nuanced understanding about the complex, diverse, and 
dynamic Afghan demographics and culture, which are comprised equally of friendly, 
hostile, and neutral stakeholders.  Both the CIMIC Handbooks of Baghlan Province and 
of Afghanistan facilitate an understanding of the Afghan history, culture, and life.104 
Similar to Baker, the HUNSOF uses local proxies such as religious leaders, local 
governmental employees and other executives to influence the Afghan population within 
the assigned areas of Wardak province in favor of ISAF and the HUNSOF.  Also, the 
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HUNSOF has developed a network of informants in order to gain information with which 
the HUNSOF can first generate intelligence, then plan and execute kinetic and non-
kinetic actions against insurgents, specifically against their improvised explosive device 
planting networks. 
The HUNSOF also exploits their force multiplier capability.  Hungarian and U.S. 
SOFs train the Afghan National Police Provincial Reserve Company for Wardak 
province.  It is helpful that all Hungarian military personnel are experts of 
Soviet/Russian-made small arms and light weapons; therefore, the HUNSOF is qualified 
to provide inter alia weapon handling to Afghan Security Forces who are also equipped 
with Soviet/Russian-made weapons. 
To summarize, the HUNSOF has reached out to relevant stakeholders, established 
sufficient levels of collaboration with them, and achieved local embeddedness.  Strong 
and weak ties are vital to developing and sustaining high levels of situational awareness 
and information flow, which are the starting points for targeting Taliban insurgents, al 
Qaeda, and affiliated extremists with direct and indirect actions.  As a result of their 
advancing collaboration with relevant stakeholders, the HUNSOF is receiving 
increasingly greater amounts of information from which the HUNSOF generates 
actionable intelligence, puts names on the Joint Prioritized Effect List, and finally carries 
out arrests. 
Afghanistan is the first employment for the developing HUNSOF; thus, there is 
room for improvement in many fields.  The deployed HUNSOF in Afghanistan has 
identified lessons learned in the fields of logistics, operator’s equipment and weaponry, 
and compatibility of different technologies that might improve deployability, 
sustainability, and survivability of future rotations, contingents, and the whole HDF.  
Equally important for mission success is the HUNSOF’s ability to collaborate with 
relevant stakeholders.  Therefore, the future strategic command and control element of 
the HUNSOF should improve its ability to collaborate with relevant stakeholders.  This 
thesis provides a recommendation to improve the HUNSOF ability to collaborate with 
stakeholders in Chapter VII. 
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C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Several models measure combat effectiveness, but none of them is universally 
accepted or focuses on collaboration with indigenous forces and population.  Therefore, 
this thesis designed a Collaborative Assessment Guide and assessed the effectiveness of 
the HUNSOF in Afghanistan with this model.  Figure 4 depicts the Collaborative 
Assessment Guide. 
Collaborative Assessment Guide
The Collaborative Assessment Guide provides a set of guiding 
criteria to assesses Special Operations Forces (SOF) 
effectiveness in multinational operations and campaigns, and 
determines whether or not these forces collaborate sufficiently 
with relevant stakeholders.
Collaborative Assessment Guide assesses:
• SOF ability to collaborate with allied / partner SOF during 
pre-deployment and employment periods;
• SOF ability to collaborate with national conventional forces 
during pre-employment and employment periods;
• SOF ability to collaborate with allied / partner conventional 
forces during pre-employment and employment periods;
• SOF ability to collaborate with indigenous forces and 
population during employment period.
 
Figure 4. Collaborative Assessment Guide 
The population-centric approach of special operations forces could and does 
contribute to winning the hybrid war in Afghanistan.  These forces carry out both direct 
and indirect actions.  This chapter argued that the HUNSOF managed to insert itself into 
the completely foreign cultural milieu of Afghanistan and establish a sufficient level of 
collaboration with all relevant indigenous, international, and national stakeholders.  To be 
able to further improve its ability to collaborate with stakeholders, the HUNSOF needs to 
increase deployment in other theaters as well.  The next chapter concludes the findings of 
this thesis and provides recommendations. 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has recorded and analyzed the Hungarian experience of developing 
special operations forces between 2003 and 2009.  In 2003, the Hungarian Ministry of 
Defense’s comprehensive defense review identified special operations forces as a “niche” 
capability that could add strength to the defense forces and fill critical shortfalls in Peace 
Support Operations.  The Hungarian political leadership endorsed developing a special 
operations capability package to enhance national security, contribute to the collective 
security of NATO and the EU, and fill shortfalls in Peace Support Operations led by 
these two international organizations. 
The HDF scheduled the development of the HUNSOF in two phases.  Units 
missing from the HUNSOF capability package were to be established in phase one.  For 
instance, the 34th ‘László Bercsényi’ Special Operations Battalion was established 
September 1, 2005, and the long-range reconnaissance battalion was transformed into a 
special forces battalion in phase one.  This thesis studied the transformation of the long-
range reconnaissance battalion into a special forces battalion in phase one.  The 
cooperation between units in the HUNSOF capability package is to be strengthened in 
phase two.  The 34th ‘László Bercsényi’ Special Operations Battalion is being 
transformed into a special operations battalion in the ongoing phase two.  Hungarian 
subject matter experts should analyze phase two in the future. 
The deployment of the HUNSOF in Afghanistan is evidence of the progress the 
HDF made in developing its SOF in the last seven years.  The HDF have created the legal 
framework for developing and employing its SOF: The Paper of the Chief of Defense 
Staff of the Ministry of Defense adequately regulates the employment of the HUNSOF 
capability package within and beyond the boundaries of the Republic of Hungary.  The 
HDF established units missing from the HUNSOF capability package, as well as the 
tactical and operational command and control elements of the HUNSOF, and made 
progress in integrating these forces into the Hungarian defense establishment.  Mentored 
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by U.S. instructors, the HDF selected, trained, and educated the HUNSOF personnel.  By 
deploying the HUNSOF in Afghanistan, the political and military leadership have 
achieved one of the national interests in developing these forces:  The HUNSOF fills 
shortfalls in NATO-led ISAF. 
Nevertheless, this thesis identified five points in which the development and 
employment of the HUNSOF could be improved.  Most important among these points is 
that the political and military leadership should fully exploit the capabilities of these 
forces for the security of Hungary. 
 Capabilities of the HUNSOF should be fully exploited. 
 The development and deployment of the HUNSOF require greater 
financial support. 
 The HUNSOF should have a strategic command and control element that 
could more efficiently deal with the challenges this thesis identified during 
the development and the deployment of the HUNSOF. 
 The development of the HUNSOF also requires the cumulation of 
knowledge, the collection of best international practices, the study of the 
SOF discipline, and the preparation of analyses and recommendations. 
 The HUNSOF should improve their ability to collaborate with relevant 
indigenous and international stakeholders involved in conflicts. 
The next section provides recommendations of how to address these five points 
and enhance the development and employment of the HUNSOF. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis recommends carrying out the following five recommendations to 
address the aforementioned points at which the development and employment of the 
HUNSOF could be improved.  The Hungarian defense establishment should consider 
employing the HUNSOF as both an anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism capability.  
Danish, German, Norwegian, and Polish special operation forces, and especially their 
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special forces elements, are designed to protect, save, and rescue citizens and national 
interests abroad.  The police assume purview for anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism 
tasks inside the boundaries of democracies, while the special forces of the defense 
establishment take these tasks abroad.  The Hungarian defense establishment should 
analyze this division of labor and, if it has more benefits than the current one, adopt it.  
By doing so, Hungary could fulfill other national interests in developing its SOF:  To add 
strength to the defense forces and enhance national security. 
The HDF should allocate national financial resources to the development of the 
HUNSOF in the mid- and long-terms.  This thesis acknowledges that current Hungarian 
political, economic, and social conditions do not allow the HDF to invest national money 
into the development of the HUNSOF.  Nonetheless, it is odd that the development of the 
HUNSOF, which is considered to be one of the major ongoing HDF development 
projects, is currently financed privately from external financial sources.  Should political, 
economic and social conditions turn favorable, the HDF should also invest Hungarian 
forints into the development of the HUNSOF.  By doing so, less time would be required 
to meet force proposals to NATO and attain world-class and fully operational special 
operations forces. 
The HDF should, in the short-term, assign a two-star Deputy Commander of the 
HDF Joint Forces Command for Special Operations Forces with a small expert staff.  As 
this thesis pointed out, the future strategic command and control element of the HUNSOF 
would have to advise the political and military leadership about how to more efficiently 
develop, deploy, and manage the HUNSOF.  Tasks of the future strategic command and 
control element of the HUNSOF should include, but not be limited to: 
 Maintaining public support for the HUNSOF employment in Afghanistan 
and elsewhere; 
 Lobbying for better financial conditions that could enhance the 




 Advising the political and military leadership on the avoidance of other 
ambitious force proposals to NATO in connection with the HUNSOF; 
 Developing a comprehensive retention policy for the HUNSOF; 
 Maintaining and improving cooperation with the mentoring U.S. SOF and 
NSCC, and continuing the assignment of HUNSOF personnel abroad for 
training and educational purposes in order to collect further knowledge 
and experience; and 
 Improving the HUNSOF ability to collaborate with relevant indigenous 
and international stakeholders involved in conflicts in order to achieve a 
more effective operational activity. 
This thesis acknowledges that the establishment of a Hungarian Special 
Operations Command and the creation of a Hungarian Special Operations Service are not 
realistic ambitions and are inopportune in the short- and mid-terms.  The outlined Special 
Operations Section at the Department for Operation and Training of the Ministry of 
Defense will have even less responsibility than a National Military Staff Element for 
Special Operations, the least ambitious of the possible organizational designs for 
stewardship of SOF.  Moreover, this future Section led by a lieutenant colonel or a 
colonel could not provide sufficient levels of representation of SOF interests within the 
Hungarian defense establishment, employ influence, or effectively tackle the five major 
challenges.  Again, the NATO SOF Study provides a useful point of reference to find an 
adequate solution: 
. . . [there is] the need for SOF leaders to have sufficient rank to operate as 
equals with, and have the appropriate level of influence among, their 
counterparts in the military services and on the national military staff.105 
Former services are today represented and supervised by two-star generals who are 
Deputies of the three-star Commander of the Joint Forces Command.  There are four 
Deputies responsible for land forces, air forces and air defense forces, logistics; and the 
                                                 
105 NSCC, NATO SOF Study, 21. 
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Chief of Staff of the JFC.  Bearing in mind the NATO SOF Study’s point of reference and 
the current organizational design of the HDF, the Deputy Commander of the JFC for 
Special Operations Forces should also be a two-star general.  The two-star general 
Deputy Commander of the JFC for Special Operations Forces, with a small expert staff, 
could effectively represent SOF interests, employ influence, and deal with the above 
mentioned major challenges.  The Deputy Commander of the JFC for Special Operations 
Forces could also become a cornerstone for building the Special Operations Forces 
Command in the long-term if the current organizational design of the HDF changes. 
The HDF and the HUNSOF community should develop subject matter experts by 
continuing to assign non-commissioned and commissioned officers to attend foreign 
military schools, academies, centers, and other educational institutions in the short-term.  
The development and employment of the HUNSOF also require thinkers who cumulate 
knowledge, collect best international practices, rigorously and systematically study the 
SOF discipline, prepare analyses and recommendations, analyze SOF history, follow 
international trends, and study how to optimize the stewardship of the HUNSOF.  The 
HDF does not, however, have an institution that could teach SOF- and SF-related 
subjects to its SOF.  In the short-term, the HDF should, thus, continue assigning non-
commissioned and commissioned officers to carry out education abroad and improving 
its HUNSOF by exploiting the gathered knowledge and experience of reassigned 
graduates.  The HDF and the HUNSOF community could develop their subject matter 
experts by assigning the Peace Support Training Centre for the NATO Centre of 
Excellence for SOF in the mid and long-terms. 
The HUNSOF and its SF component should change their personnel selection 
mechanism and develop a balanced set of selection criteria that assesses candidates for 
skills that facilitate and enhance both direct and indirect actions in special operations.  
Tests and questionnaires that were designed to determine whether candidates meet 
psychological requirements to become long-range reconnaissance operators, paratroopers 
and scuba-divers who solely carried out direct actions are still in use for SF operators 
who, if selected, will also carry out indirect tasks.  HUNSOF lessons learned from 
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Afghanistan indicate that collaboration with indigenous and international stakeholders 
involved in conflicts is vital for mission success.  To achieve collaboration with relevant 
stakeholders, SOF operators should possess social skills such as cultural sensitivity, 
flexibility, patience, openness, and advanced communication skills. 
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